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THE UNCERTAINTY PRINCIPLE IN THE
SUPREME COURT
CRAIG M. BRADLEY*

To remain effective, the Supreme Court must continue to decide only
those cases which present questions whose resolution will have immediate importance far beyond the particular facts and parties involved.'
This unexceptionable statement, made by Chief Justice Fred M.
Vinson to the American Bar Association in 1949, is, most would agree, a
reasonable explanation of why the Supreme Court decides to hear a case.
As Chief Justice Vinson made clear, the purpose of hearing a case is
neither to correct errors in lower court decisions nor to decide all interesting questions that come the Court's way, but to "resolve conflicts of
opinion on federal questions that have arisen among lower courts [a]nd
to pass upon questions of wide import under the Constitution, laws, and
2
treaties of the United States."
Although the resolution of such matters may be the ideal toward
which the Court strives, it is not, in most cases, what the Court in fact
achieves. It must be admitted that the Court frequently resolves the factspecific issue presented to it, as well as certain narrow questions of statutory or regulatory law. In adjudication of constitutional issues, however,
such resolution is in most cases inherently unattainable. 3 Instead of
* Charles L. Whistler Professor of Law, Indiana University (Bloomington) School of Law.
A.B., University of North Carolina (Chapel Hill); J.D., University of Virginia School of Law. The
author wishes to express his appreciation to Professors Paul Brest, Daniel Conkle, Bryant Garth,
Julius Getman, Gerald Gunther, John Jeffries, and Dean (now Judge) Morris Arnold for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this article.
Much of the research for this article was conducted while the author was a Visiting Scholar at
Stanford Law School, to which he expresses appreciation for the hospitality extended to him.
1. Address of Chief Justice Vinson before American Bar Association (Sept. 7, 1949), reprinted
in R. STERN & E. GRESSMAN, SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 259 (5th ed. 1978).
2. R. STERN & E. GRESSMAN,supra iote 1, at 258 (emphasis added).
3. Of course, there are a few cases in which certain constitutional issues are truly resolved.
Consider, for example, the recent case of Maryland v. Macon, 105 S.Ct. 2778 (1985). In Macon,
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resolving constitutional issues, the Court merely stimulates or, perhaps,

refocuses debate. It is nearly impossible to think of a constitutional issue
that has been "settled" by the Court-to find a case where lawyers for

interested parties to potential disputes packed up their briefcases and

4
went home.
This article will demonstrate that there is an uncertainty principle s

at work in the judicial process: any attempt to achieve certainty regarding any important constitutional issue is unlikely to succeed and-even if

it does succeed in the short run-will inevitably create uncertainty as to
more issues than it settles. The process of rendering a decision will tend
to distort the issue decided as well as the applicable precedents and

doctrines.

6

This is not, as most commentators seem to assume, the result of
poorly drafted decisions by the Court. Although poorly written opinions
can certainly contribute mightily to the problem, it is an inherent feature
of the adjudicative process, as the Court has always defined that process,
that uncertainty will be a by-product of any attempt to decide constitutional disputes. If this thesis is true, then criticisms of the Court's inability to resolve issues miss a major point: even the best drafted, most
perspicacious Supreme Court opinion will not lay difficult constitutional
disputes to rest. The message to the Court, then, is to recognize these
limits on its ability and not to take cases with the expectation that its
plainclothes policemen entered an "adult bookstore," purchased two magazines, compared the
magazines to their criteria for obscenity, and immediately arrested the proprietor of the store without a warrant. The Court decided three issues in a brief opinion joined by seven Justices: (1) entry
of such a store is not a "search" under the fourth amendment; (2) a purchase of such magazines is
not a seizure; (3) and the validity of the warrantless arrest is not at issue because no evidence was
obtained pursuant to it. Id. at 2782-83. The Court did not consider whether the magazines were
actually obscene. Essentially, the Court was presented with three "yes or no" questions (the second
of which was novel) and answered them with little elaboration. Although it is not clear that the
Court's answers were correct, see id. at 2783-86 (Brennan, J., dissenting), it is certainly correct that
they were clear. Few constitutional issues can, however, be addressed so succinctly.
4. To the extent that the Court desires its decisions to create controversy and, in that way, to
promote doctrinal advancement, I offer no suggestions. Frequently, however, the Court decides
cases in an attempt to resolve unanswered questions regarding given doctrine. This goal is rarely
achieved; when it is achieved, the cost is the creation of more questions than were resolved.
5. The term is borrowed from the science of nuclear physics, where the uncertainty principle-often denoted the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle-holds that it is impossible to ascertain
with complete accuracy both the position and the velocity of a particle because the process of measuring one characteristic introduces great uncertainty in the measurement of the other.
6. See, eg., Oregon v. Elstad, 105 S. Ct. 1285, 1299 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting):
The Court's decision says much about the way the Court currently goes about implementing its agenda. In imposing its new rule ... the Court mischaracterizes our precedents,
obfuscates the central issues, and altogether ignores the practical realities of custodial interrogation that have led nearly every lower court to reject its simplistic reasoning. Moreover, the Court adopts startling and unprecedented methods of construing constitutional
guarantees. Finally the Court reaches out once again to address issues not before us.
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decision will "settle" an "important question of federal law."'7 Instead,
the Court ought to recognize that a decision will generally create more
controversy and doctrinal confusion than it will resolve. As this discus-

sion will show, in some areas this may be a desirable outcome.8 But if
the Court does not desire unstable doctrine and decades of litigation over
a series of issues raised by a decision, then it should forbear from taking
the case at all. 9
For example, the Court cannot, in one or two cases, decide the lim-

its of civic participation in religious holidays. 10 Unless the Court was
prepared to decide a long series of cases on this issue-which is arguably

of slight constitutional significance, but which stirs great public passions
and considerable litigation"-it should have stayed out of this area and
7. Sup. Cr. R. 17(1)(c). See also Michigan v. Clifford, 464 U.S. 287, 289 (1984) ("We granted
certiorari to clarify doubt that appears to exist as to the application of our decision in [Michigan v.]
Tyler."); Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 3 (1976) ("We granted certiorari to resolve the conflict on
this important question.").
8. See infra notes 31-43, 57-60 and accompanying text.
9. Although this article stresses the virtues of passivity, it does not endorse the "passive virtues" expounded by Professor'Alexander Bickel. In The Least DangerousBranch-The Supreme
Court at the Bar of Politics,Bickel discussed the constitutional validity of judicial review of legislative enactments and concluded that such review is only justifiable as a "process for the injection into
representative government of a system of enduring basic values." A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH-THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF PoLITics 51 (1962). Accordingly, Bickel
urged the Court to avail itself more often of the devices by which a decision could be avoidedstanding, ripeness, political question, and so on-where such avoidance would "turn the thrust of
forces favoring and opposing a [particular position] toward the legislature, where the power of at
least initial decision properly belongs in our system ....
Id. at 148.
This article deals not with how the Court must act in order to legitimate its power of judicial
review or with the Court's proper place in the constitutional constellation, but with the more pragmatic consideration of how it can avoid, insofar as possible, causing undue confusion in the legal
community and society at large. For my purposes, Bickel's quasi-jurisdictional devices for avoiding
a decision on the merits are not passive. Invocation of such doctrines by the Court is an aggressive
statement that this litigant and all future litigants in his position will not be heard in the federal
courts. Such a decision may also lead to as much litigation and confusion as would a decision on the
merits, as parties-try to convince courts that they have standing or that their cause is ripe. For a
more detailed critique of Bickel's view, see Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the "Passive Virtues," 64
COLUM. L. REv. 1 (1964). My view concerning the type of case the Court should resolve is in some
ways the opposite of that advanced by Bickel. One commentator neatly summarized Bickel's conclusion: "[I]f the great political cases are incapable of principled resolution, then the Court ought to
decline decision of such cases." Barron, The Ambiguity of JudicialReview: A Response to Professor
Bickel, 1970 DUKE L.J. 591, 595. My thesis is that most constitutional issues, great and otherwise,
simply cannot be resolved by the Court. There are, however, narrower issues that can be resolved,
and unresolvable fundamental issues that are sufficiently important for the Court to want to stimulate and refocus debate over an extended period of time. These are the cases it should decide. It
should avoid cases where its attempts to resolve issues will produce only confusion and litigation
without the offsetting benefit of encouraging or redirecting controversy on issues where such controversy is desirable.
10. See infra notes 316-32 and accompanying text.
11. See, for example, Doerner, Like ChristmasesPast, TIME, Dec. 24, 1984, at 10, 10: "[Lynch
v. Donnelly] failed to settle the matter. Creche critics... are seeking to severely limit the [C]ourt's
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denied certiorari in Lynch v. Donnelly. The alternative is intense litigation lasting a decade or two, until, exhausted by the ordeal, everyone
gives up, with matters no more clearly resolved than they were at the
start.
Recognizing its limitations, the Court should take two courses of
action more frequently. First, it should deny certiorari or dismiss appeals for want of a substantial federal question 12 in cases such as Lynch,
where extended confusion and debate over how far towns may go in celebrating Christmas is not sufficiently critical to the fundamental separation-of-church-and-state issue to warrant an extended series of decisions.
Second, recognizing that doctrinal clarity and meaningful guidance to
executive and legislative authorities are usually impossible to achieve, but
that some resolution of particular issues may be necessary, the Court
should resolve such cases by simply balancing the facts of each particular
case without purporting either to rely on past cases or to declare guidelines for future ones.1 3 Thus the resolution of a particular case would not
encourage lawyers to try to distinguish it nor the Court to try to clarify it
in the future, because it would not have meaning beyond that case. Currently, all such "ad hoc" balancing by the Court involves reliance on past
decisions 14 and, frequently, creation of guidelines for future ones. 15 Consequently, these determinations suffer from the uncertainty principle just
as other decisions do.
As Dean Roscoe Pound observed in 1908, "[tlhe nadir of mechanical jurisprudence is reached when conceptions are used, not as premises
from which to reason, but as ultimate solutions."' 16 In 1938, the Supreme
Court rejected the transcendental view of the law, which had led to the
ruling. As a result, the jingle bells of the season were interrupted by the jangle of legal discord."
This article then cited examples, from six cities, of litigation or potential litigation sparked by the
Supreme Court's holding. Id.
12. Note that this course does not present the same problems in my approach that it did in
Bickel's. See supra note 9. Bickel proposed that the Court dismiss the most significant cases for
want of a substantial federal question-a contradiction in terms and, in Gunther's view, see Gunther, supra note 9, at 25, a dereliction of the Court's duty. I am merely proposing that the Court's
conception of which questions are insubstantial be expanded somewhat from the current practice.
13. In Germany, for example, there is no doctrine of stare decisis; decisions are rendered on a
case-by-case basis. Bradley, The Exclusionary Rule in Germany, 96 HARM. L. REV. 1032, 1037
(1983). "In practice, however, German courts rely on, distinguish, and overrule their prior opinions
much as courts do in a 'common law jurisdiction.'" Id. See also Damaska, StructuresofAuthority
and Comparative Criminal Procedure, 84 YALE L.J. 480, 497 (1975) (discussing how continental

legal systems approach and apply decisions).
14. See, eg., Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 181-82 (1984) (denouncing case-by-case
balancing as a method of deciding fourth amendment cases and relying instead on a series of past
decisions).
15. See, eg., Erznoznik v. Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 209-12 (1975). Erznoznik is discussed
infra notes 284-89 and accompanying text.
16. Pound, MechanicalJurisprudence, 8 COLuM. L. REv. 605, 620-21 (1908).
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mischievous results that Pound decried. 17 No longer could the judicial

process be viewed as a "mechanical application of clear-cut rules to
clear-cut categories to arrive at indisputably just solutions to unambiguously characterized problems," 18 as had previously been claimed.
Although the Court today would make no such claim, it does consider
itself competent to "resolve" disputes on important questions of federal
law,' 9 to "clarify doubt," 20 and to promulgate "bright lines" 2 1 for lower
courts and executive and legislative officials to follow. Yet the existence
of such purported "bright lines" and "clarification" leads everyonefrom the policeman in Gas City, Indiana, to the Supreme Court itself-to

fall into the trap of mechanical jurisprudence. Patently unreasonable
searches by law enforcement officials may be approved because they fall

mechanically within the definition of "searches incident to arrest" or
"automobile searches,"' 22 and a carefully drafted ordinance may be
struck down because it fails to conform completely to the requirements
of the "commercial speech" doctrine. 23 More commonly, however, the
Court promulgates guidelines for others to follow, then later fails to follow those guidelines itself while attempting to do justice in a particular
case.2 4 The resulting confusion leads all affected parties, unsure of the
17. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 79 (1938) (rejecting view that there is "a transcendental body of law outside of any particular state but obligatory within it unless and until changed by
statute") (quoting Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer

Co., 276 U.S. 518, 533 (1928) (Holmes,'J., dissenting)).
18. This summary of the transcendental view is derived from Merryman, The Authority ofAuthority, 6 STAN. L. REv. 613, 623 n.17 (1954).
19. Sup. Cr. R. 17.
20. See, ag., Michigan v. Clifford, 464 U.S. 287, 289 (1984).
21. For example, this term is found in Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 430 (1981), in
Justice Powell's characterization of the majority opinion in New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454
(1981). The Belton Court had stated that the "protection of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments 'can only be realized if the police are acting under a set of rules which, in most cases, makes it
possible to reach a correct determination beforehand as to whether an invasion of privacy is justified
in the interests of law enforcement.'" Belton, 453 U.S. at 458 (quoting LaFave, "Case-By-Case
Adjudication" Versus "StandardizedProcedures" The Robinson Dilemma, 1974 Sup. Cr. REv. 127,
142).
22. See infra notes 70-107 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 129-65 and accompanying text.
24. A typical example of the differing approaches to the problem posed by precedent may be
found in Aguilar v. Felton, 105 S.Ct. 3232 (1985) (aid to parochial schools). In a concurring opinion, Justice Powell felt compelled to strike down the educational programs in question-despite the
fact that they had "done so much good and little, if any, detectable harm," id. at 3239 (quoting
Felton v. Secretary, United States Dep't of Educ., 739 F.2d 48, 72 (2d Cir. 1984))-because "precedents of this Court require... invalidat[ion]," id. at 3239. Three dissenting Justices, on the other
hand, felt no such compunction and indicated that the precedents could easily be read not to require
such a result. Id. at 3242 (Burger, J.,
dissenting); idat 3243 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); id. at 3243
(O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
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rules, to act on an ad hoc basis while claiming to follow the guidelines
that the Court has declared.
The uncertainty inherent in Supreme Court decisions cannot be
eliminated. 25 What can be eliminated is the secondary uncertainty that
arises when everyone, from the Supreme Court on down, claims to know
what the rules are. The Court should abandon, in all but certain leading
or "fulcrum" cases, 26 the attempt to base its decisions on precedent, and
it should simply balance the facts on the fulcrum (such as "reasonableness" in fourth amendment cases) that the leading case established.
Lower courts and government officials-and the Supreme Court Justices
themselves-would then be relieved of the impossible and harmful process of "finding" light where there is only darkness. Courts and government officials would be obliged to justify their actions and decisions in
terms of common sense rather than allegiance to Supreme Court doctrines that can reasonably be cited to justify several possible results.
Moreover, they would be disciplined by the knowledge that actions
deemed unreasonable would be subject to reversal by the Court.
This article does not propose case-by-case balancing as the answer
to all constitutional questions. Certain rights are absolute and cannot be
balanced. For example, the sixth amendment right of a criminal defendant to counsel 27 and the fifth amendment right not to testify at one's own
criminal trial2 8 cannot be "balanced" or compromised, regardless of the
facts of the particular case (though the Court has recognized a limit on
the former right when imprisonment is not imposed). 29 Other areas of
law, such as the school desegregation decisions, involve major doctrinal
changes and thus require extended justification, as well as repeated reaf25. "[C]ertainty generally is [an] illusion, and repose is not the destiny of man." Holmes, The

Pathof the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 466 (1897). Jerome Frank recognized long ago that uncertainty is an inevitable and necessary aspect of the law. In Law and the Modern Mind, he observed
that "law... is uncertain, indefinite, subject to incalculable changes." J. FRANK, LAW AND THE
MODERN MIND 5 (1930). Frank was reacting to the old view that law was immutable-something
to be "discovered" by the courts. He recognized the uncertainty inherent in law, applauded it as
being necessary to social progress, and offered a psychological explanation for the desire, shared by
everyone, for certainty in the law. What Frank did not recognize is that court decisions create

greater uncertainty than necessary and that the process of finding legal absolutes-supposedly abandoned in the 1930's-continues in a different guise today.
26. For a discussion of the types of cases appropriate for ad hoc balancing, see infra notes 306.

08 and accompanying text.
27. See, eg., Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972) (right to counsel guaranteed in
misdemeanor cases where defendant is imprisoned); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342-45
(1963) (right to counsel guaranteed in felony cases).

28. See, eg., Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965) (neither court nor prosecution may
comment on accused's exercise of his fifth amendment right against self-incrimination).
29. See, e.g., Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373-74 (1979) (indigent defendant may not be
sentenced to prison term unless counsel was appointed for him).
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firmation, supervision, and modification over a period of years. In cases
such as these, ad hoc balancing has no place.
The majority of cases decided by the Court do not, however, involve
the enunciation of absolute rights or major shifts in doctrine. Instead
they involve attempts to explain when, for example, automobiles may be
searched, billboards prohibited, religious observances curtailed, or admissions used against criminal defendants. The Court is attempting to
clarify existing doctrine or to apply it to new fact situations; it is not
making major doctrinal changes or promulgating absolute rules. In these
types of cases-the bread and butter of the Supreme Court docket 3 0-the
Court fails miserably and consistently. It fails to provide guidelines; it
fails to resolve doubt; it obfuscates rather than clarifies doctrine for reasons that are inherent in the judicial process. Rules and guidelines invariably degenerate into incomprehensibility; they serve only as a crutch
for those who would limp toward a foolish consistency or as a mask for
ideological preference. This article argues that such attempts at providing rules and guidelines should be abandoned and each case should be
decided on its own merits; the Court should return only to the fulcrum
established in the principal case, rather than to the convoluted discussions of precedent in that and subsequent decisions.
I.

THE PROCESS OF CREATING UNCERTAINTY

A Supreme Court decision usually does not "resolve" a constitutional issue; it stimulates and sometimes refocuses debate. No one would
claim that any sort of final resolution of the basic issues surrounding
school desegregation or the fifth amendment rights of criminal suspects
31
was attained by the seminal decisions in Brown v. Board of Education,
and Miranda v. Arizona.32 Rather, the Court continues to "explain"
what those cases and their progeny mean. For example, when the Court
decided Brown, the problem of segregated schools did not disappear from
the country or from the courts. On the contrary, efforts to enforce Brown
30. See Sup. Cr. R. 17.1 (in exercising Court's discretion to grant certiorari, reasons that will
be considered include resolving conflicts between two federal courts of appeals, between two state
courts of last resort, or between a federal court of appeals and a state court of last resort); see
generally Note, Deciding Whether Conflicts with Supreme Court Precedent Warrant Certiorari,59
N.Y.U. L. REv. 1104 (1984) (Supreme Court is justified in granting certiorari to resolve conflict
between lower court decision and Supreme Court precedent when such conflict threatens precedential authority or integrity of the juducial hierarchy); cf. Estreicher & Sexton, A ManagerialTheory of
the Supreme Court's Responsibilities: An Empirical Study, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 681, 791-92 (1984)
(Court often grants review simply to undo perceived error or "to correct mere error when its judicial
philosophy is at variance with philosophy prevailing in lower courts").
31. 347 U.S. 483 (1954); see also Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 299-301 (1955) (discussing how integration decision was to be implemented).
32. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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led to tremendous upheaval and made names such as James Meredith
and Orval Faubus household words. On the legal side, a series of subse-

quent decisions was necessary to address the ramifications of the initial
holding in Brown. A plan that allowed white students to transfer out of
schools in which they were in the minority 33 was struck down, as was a
plan that allowed "freedom of choice." 34 The case that rendered the lat-

ter decision, Green v. County School Board, made it necessary for the
Court in subsequent cases 35 to discuss the implications of its requirement

'36
that a plan must be adopted that "promises realistically to work now."

Brown also gave rise to questions about such matters as faculty segrega38

tion 37 and busing.
All of these cases followed directly from Brown because each centered on the issue of how schools were to be desegregated. The decision
that "separate but equal" was an invalid doctrine had far broader impli41
40
cations, affecting areas such as housing, 39 employment, and welfare.
Thus the original Brown decision, while resolving little, invited litigation
and public debate on the issue of racial equality. Over the ensuing three
decades, the debate was gradually shifted. Southern governors no longer
bar the doors of schools to blacks, as they did following Brown. The

Court's determination in this area-its willingness to pursue the many
new avenues opened by the Brown decision-has pushed the debate away

from whether blacks should attend separate schools to whether blacks
should, for example, enjoy special consideration in school admissions 42

33. See Goss v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 683, 688 (1963) (transfer plan that allowed white
students to transfer from desegregated school was racially motivated and promoted discrimination).
34. Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 441-42 (1968) (rejecting "freedom of choice"
plan as ineffective desegregation method).
35. E.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 13-14, 18-32 (1971).
36. Green, 391 U.S. at 439 (emphasis in original).
37. See, eg., United States v. Montgomery County Bd. of Educ., 395 U.S. 225, 231-36 (1969)
(upholding district court order instituting plan for system-wide faculty and staff desegregation).
38. See, eg., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 29-31 (1971) (holding
it within district court's powers to order busing of students in implementing desegregation plan).
39. See, eg., Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 379-81 (1967) (Court's decisions condemning
state statutes that condoned or authorized segregation in restaurant facilities and services illustrate
the range of situations in which discriminatory state action can be identified).
40. See, eg., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240-45 (1976) (citing school desegregation
cases to support the principle that statutes reflecting intent or purpose to discriminate against applicants on the basis of race violate the equal protection clause).
41. See, eg., Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 545-51 (1972) (upholding as rational and
permissible a state constitutional limitation on amount of welfare assistance grants despite its alleged
invidious effects on blacks and Mexicans).
42. See, eg., Regents of Univ. of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 271-72 (1978) (invalidating
university's special admissions program, but holding that race may be considered in admissions
decisions).
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and employment. 43
It is hardly surprising that Brown led to much litigation and debate,
or that the debate is not yet over; Brown and its progeny sought to
restructure society. Consider, by contrast, a far "simpler" case; a case
that established a straightforward rule for public officials to follow and
had no necessary societal implications beyond the narrow confines of the
decision. Such a case is Miranda v. Arizona.44 In Miranda the Court
held that an incriminating statement made by a suspect in custody must
be presumed involuntary-and is consequently not admissible against
him at trial-unless "[p]rior to any questioning, the person [has been]
warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does
make may be used in evidence against him, and that he has a right to the
' '45
presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed.
It is hard to imagine a more clearcut pronouncement by the Court.
Unlike Brown, the Miranda decision set forth a precise course of action
(the warnings) for an identifiable group of public officials (the police) in a
specified setting (custodial interrogation). The remedy (evidentiary exclusion) was also clear and already in place. Yet Miranda, like Brown,
has led to endless litigation, and the Court now calls the decision "slippery" 46 and "murky." 47 What is "custody"? 48 What is "interrogation"? 4 9 Does the remedy apply if the defendant first invokes his right to
silence or counsel and then talks? 50 May statements obtained in violation
43. See, e.g., Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 779-80 (1976) (victims of illegal
hiring discrimination are entitled to retroactive seniority).
44. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
45. Id. at 444.
46. Oregon v. Elstad, 105 S.Ct. 1285, 1293 (1985) ("[TIhe task of defining 'custody' is a slippery one .... ).
47. See, for example, the dissenting opinion of Justice Brennan in Oregon v. Elstad, 105 S.Ct.
1285, 1319-20 (1985): "Miranda will become 'murky' ... only because the Court's opinion today
threatens to become a self-fulfilling prophecy.... The whole point of the Court's work in this area
has been to prescribe 'bright line' rules to give clear guidance to the authorities." (footnote omitted).
48. See Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341, 345 (1976) (custody does not include interrogation in noncustodial circumstances after a police investigation has focused on the suspect).
49. See Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980) (concluding that "the term 'interrogation' under Miranda refers not only to express questioning, but also to any words or actions on the
part of the police ... that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating
response from the suspect") (footnotes omitted).
50. See Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 485-87 (1981) (holding inadmissible a statement
made by defendant without counsel after defendant had invoked his right to counsel); Michigan v.
Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 104-05 (1975) (no violation of Miranda principles where police stopped questioning defendant at his request, because when questioning was resumed after significant time lapse,
defendant was given fresh Miranda warnings and was not questioned about the crime which was the
subject of the first interrogation).
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of Miranda be used to impeach the defendant's testimony at trial?5'
Does the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine apply to Miranda violations?52 And so on.
The Court has attempted to decide each of these sub-issues, but each
decision discussing the ramifications of Miranda has further ramifications of its own that must be explored. For example, Michigan v. Mosley 5 3 held that after a warned defendant asserts his right to silence he
may subsequently be questioned about an "unrelated" offense after a reiteration of the Miranda warnings.5 4 What about a defendant questioned
later about the same offense? Is the second set of warnings necessary?
After what period of time may questioning resume once the defendant
indicates that he does not want to talk? None of these questions was
resolved by Mosley, and they remain unanswered by the Court today.5
Although the Court has itself muddied the waters in this area by cutting
back on Miranda without overruling it,56 most of the questions raised by
Miranda would have presented themselves regardless of the composition
of the Supreme Court and regardless of the quality of the draftmanship
57
of Miranda and its progeny.
The Court can hardly be said to have resolved the basic issues of
Brown and Miranda: the extent of governmental involvement in bringing
about racial integration, and the extent of the fifth amendment rights of
criminal suspects. Nevertheless, these issues are of such import that they
deserved the attention given to them. Although the Court has not resolved the basic issues, it has shifted the debate. No longer does anyone
seriously claim that segregation, de jure or de facto, is appropriate in
education, transportation, and other public facilities, or that use of the
"third degree" is the proper way to interrogate criminal suspects.
In announcing major ideological shifts, Miranda and Brown required full-blown opinions, complete with references to the Constitution,
51. See Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 226 (1971) (defendant's earlier statements, taken in
violation of Miranda,may be used to impeach his credibility on the stand).
52. See Oregon v. Elstad, 105 S. Ct. 1285, 1298 (1985) ("[A] suspect who has once responded to
unwarned yet uncoercive questioning is not... disabled from waiving his rights and confessing after

he has been given the requisite Miranda warnings.").
53. 423 U.S. 96 (1975).
54. Id. at 106.
55. For a discussion of the problems raised by Mosley and some lower courts' responses to
those problems, see Stone, The MirandaDoctrinein the Burger Court, 1977 Sup. CT. REv. 99, 12937.
56. See infra notes 209-18 and accompanying text; see also Stone, supra note 55, at 106-25
(discussing Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974), and Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971)).
57. For a discussion suggesting that uncertainty is an inevitable result of every major Supreme
Court decision, see infra notes 59-165 and accompanying text.
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precedent, scholarly works, and other sources.5 8 In the following years,
further decisions reinterpreted Miranda and Brown and restated their
holdings for the purpose of justifying the result reached in these subsequent cases. At some point, these later decisions no longer served to
explain Miranda and Brown, but obfuscated their results and confused
people about just where the Court now stood. This is an inevitable process, only partly explained by the fact that a subsequent Court may not
like the earlier decision. 59 Cases that endeavor not to shift doctrine but
merely to explain it, make up the major part of the Court's docket, 60 yet
the effect of the Court's efforts at clarification has been obfuscation. A
simple ad hoc balancing approach would serve the Court and the public
far better in cases such as these.
Perhaps the most striking example of the Court's acknowledgement
of its fundamental incapacity to "resolve" issues or declare rules that can
be consistently followed arose recently in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan TransitAuthority.6 1 In that case, the Court abandoned the test of
NationalLeague of Cities v. Usery,62 which held that a state or municipal
government activity was not subject to regulation by Congress under the
commerce clause when the activity in question was a "traditional governmental function" of those entities. 63 The Court abandoned the Usery test
because it was "unworkable" 64 and led to distinctions that were "untenable."' 65 The process of trying to do justice in each case had led to a recognition of the uncertainty principle-that no test could produce
consistent, just results. Moreover, the Court concluded that no other test
66
would produce better results.
The correct response would have been for the Court to deal with
these issues case by case, balancing the interests in state sovereignty
against the interests in uniform national policy under the commerce
58. Even these seminal cases would benefit from having shorter opinions than those the Court
produced.
59. See infra notes 209-42 and accompanying text.
60. See Estreicher & Sexton, supra note 30, at 737, 777-78 (Court grants review of some cases
to resolve questions left open by its previous decisions); see also supra note 30.

61. 105 S. Ct. 1005 (1985).
62. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
63. Id. at 852.
64. Garcia, 105 S. Ct. at 1007, 1016.
65. Id. at 1013 (quoting Justice Frankfurter's description, in New York v. United States, 326
U.S. 572, 583 (1946), of the distinction between "governmental" and "proprietary" functions in

analysis of state immunity from federal taxation-a distinction that was also abandoned as
unworkable).
66. As the Court observed: "The distinction the Court discarded as unworkable in the field of
tax immunity has proved no more fruitful in the field of regulatory immunity under the Commerce
Clause. Neither do any of the alternative standards that might be employed to distinguish between
protected and unprotected governmental functions appear manageable." Id. at 1014.
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clause. 67 Instead, the Garcia Court took the extraordinary step of declaring the issue of the scope of Congress's power under the commerce clause

68
to be a political question, apparently immune from judicial scrutiny.

This conclusion, as Professor William Van Alstyne declared, was "amis-

take of historic proportions" and clearly not within the contemplation of
the framers. 69 Thus, the uncertainty principle can lead to truly momentous consequences when the Court fails to recognize it and deal with it
appropriately.

A.

The Automobile Cases.
In recent years, the Court has clung tenaciously to the principle that

warrantless searches are "per se unreasonable.., subject only to a few
specifically established and well-delineated exceptions."' 70 In fact, these

exceptions are neither few-there are over twenty of them-nor welldelineated. 7 1 Nevertheless, the Court's continued fealty to this faded
principle requires that every lawful warrantless search not only meet the
"reasonableness" standard of the fourth amendment but also, like a com-

mon law pleading, fit into one of the recognized cubbyholes of the warrant exceptions. If a case does not fit readily into a cubbyhole, either it is
squeezed in or a new cubbyhole is created. This is how the "automobile
exception" came to be.
When prohibition agents came upon a bootlegger on a lonely road in

rural Michigan in the middle of the night in the early 1920's, it was not
practicable for them to obtain a warrant before searching the car.72 Thus
the Supreme Court, in Carrollv. United States,73 approved the warrantless search. The Court's statement that in "cases where the securing of a

warrant is reasonably practicable, it must be used" 74 led some courts and
commentators to conclude that where the vehicle and its occupant were
67. This is essentially the approach suggested by Professor Van Alstyne: "[I]f Congress is...
allowed to interfere with ...purely state and local programs, under Usery it would be required to
back its authority with a judicially acceptable reason in every such case ...." Van Alstyne, The

Second Death of Federalism, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1709, 1718 (1985).
68. See Garcia, 105 S. Ct. at 1018-20.
69. Van Alstyne, supra note 67, at 1731-32.
70. United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 825 (1982) (quoting Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385,
390 (1978) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967))).
71. See Bradley, Two Models of the Fourth Amendment, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1468, 1473-74
(1985) (listing over 20 exceptions to the probable cause or the warrant requirement or to both).
72. Or so the Court concluded in Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 160-61 (1925). They
did not consider the possibility of one agent's holding the car while another went for a warrant,
presumably because obtaining one would have taken many hours, during which the remaining agent
would have to hold the bootleggers at bay.
73. 267 U.S. 132, 158 (1925).
74. Id. at 156.
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in custody-and thus where the exigent circumstances present in Carroll
75
were dispelled-a warrant would be required to search an automobile.
In Chambers v. Maroney,76 however, the Court disagreed, holding that
an automobile could be searched without a warrant even when its occupants had been arrested and the car impounded. Because, under Carroll,
the car could have been searched at the time it was stopped, the Court
reasoned that it was no greater intrusion to search it later. 77 Thus an
"automobile exception"-justified on the ground that cars were more
mobile and less private than houses 7 8-was created that went beyond the
obvious point of Carrollthat a warrant would not be required if it was
impracticable to obtain one.
With the automobile exception the Court set off on a long journey
toward an uncertain destination. That journey still continues. Can a car
79
parked at an arrestee's house be seized and searched without a warrant?
Can paint scrapings be taken without a warrant from a car parked in a
public lot?80 Can a suitcase in a car be searched without a warrant as
well?8 ' What about a paper bag or a gun case?8 2 These questions have
gradually been answered by the Court. Many other questions remain
unanswered. 83 The result of all this litigation is summarized by Professor
Wayne LaFave:
Although the United States Supreme Court has had several occasions to speak to the issue of when a warrantless search of a vehicle for
the fruits, instrumentalities or evidence of crime is permissible, the
boundaries of this authority remain uncertain. The several decisions of
the Court on this subject cannot be satisfactorily reconciled, and in
recent years the Court has often been unable to muster a majority position on the issue. It is no exaggeration, therefore, to say that these
75. See 2 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 7.2 (1978) and cases cited therein.
76. 399 U.S. 42, 52 (1970).
77. Id.
78. Id. at 50. The "less private" rationale appeared later in United States v. Chadwick, 433
U.S. 1, 12 (1977).
79. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 472-73 (1971) (plurality opinion).
80. See Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 592 (1974) (plurality opinion).
81. See United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1977). But see United States v. Ross, 456
U.S. 798, 823 (1982) (if there is probable cause to search a car, then any container in it can be
searched as well).
82. In United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982), the Court stated that "a constitutional distinction between 'worthy' and 'unworthy' containers would be improper." Id. at 822. Nevertheless,
the Court adhered to the result of a prior case, which stated that a kit of burglar tools or a gun case
would not "deserve the full protection of the Fourth Amendment," because by their nature they
"cannot support any reasonable expectation of privacy because their contents can be inferred from
their outward appearance." Id. at 814 n.19 (quoting Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 764 n.13
(1979)).
83. See 2 W. LAFAVE, supra note 75, § 7.2(a), at 508 (raising several questions concerning
scope of the automobile exception).
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Not only is the doctrine unclear, but this lack of clarity has led to an
explosion of litigation. In the 1969-70 Term, when Chambers reinvigorated the automobile exception, there were five petitions before the Court
raising auto search issues. By the 1981-82 Term, when the Court decided
United States v. Ross, 85 the most recent major case in this area, there
86
were thirty-five such petitions.
Would any other approach to the automobile cases have made matters better? Certainly a single exigent-circumstances exception to the
warrant requirement is better than twenty-three exceptions that try, and
fail, to spell out the exact circumstances where a warrant is unnecessary;
this approach had produced relatively stable doctrine in the automobile
area before Chambers.8 7 Still, there are many problems with this test as
well. First, it was not clear whether "exigent circumstances" or "impracticability" meant something different in the context of an automobile
search under Carrollthan in the context of a house search. Second, this
rule, being essentially ad hoe, gave little guidance to the police. This is
not a serious problem, because no fourth amendment rule that has gained
acceptance has given effective guidance to the police, 88 but the Court
obviously felt that it could do better. Third, the rule's timing requirements are fuzzy. At what point in the process of stopping an automobile
and arresting the occupants are "exigent circumstances" to be determined? Finally, if the rule is clarified (e.g., if the Court defines just what
factors constitute "exigent circumstances" and when those factors are
relevant), then the rule becomes too cumbersome to apply.89
84. Id. § 7.2, at 509 (footnote omitted). See also Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 430
(1981) (Powell, J., concurring) ("IThe law of search and seizure with respect to automobiles is
intolerably confusing. The Court apparently cannot agree even on what it has held previously, let
alone on how these cases should be decided.").
85. 456 U.S. 798 (1982).
86. CompareFinalSupreme CourtIndex, Topical Index, 1969-70 Term, 38 U.S.L.W. 12 (1970)
(five petitions before the Court raising auto-search issues) with FinalSupreme Court Index, Topical
Index, 1981-82 Term, 51 U.S.L.W. 33 (1982) (35 petitions before the Court raising auto-search
issues). Nor was the 1981-82 Term atypical. In the 1980-81 Term there were 35 such cases, and
there were 20 in the 1982-83 Term. See FinalSupreme Court Index, Topical Index 1980-81 Term,
50 US. L.W. 23-24 (1981); FinalSupreme Court Index, Topical Index, 1982-83 Term, 52 U.S.L.W.
40 (1983).
87. See supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text.
88. See Bradley, supra note 71, at 1468 ("The fourth amendment is the Supreme Court's
tarbaby: a mass of contradictions and obscurities that has ensnared the 'Brethren' in such a way that
every effort to extract themselves only finds them more profoundly stuck.").
89. In United States v. Dorman, 435 F.2d 385, 392-93 (D.C. Cir. 1970), the court attempted to
delineate what factors went into a determination of exigent circumstances. Professor LaFave
strongly criticized this approach. See 2 W. LAFAVE, supra note 75, § 6.1(c), at 390-95.
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Recognizing that the old approach could lead to sjippression of evidence even when the police behavior had not been unduly intrusive of
individual rights, the Court in Chambers abandoned the impracticability
rule. In its place, the Court adopted the disastrous test that automobiles
could sometimes (but not always) 90 be lawfully searched without a warrant if there was probable cause, whether or not a warrant could have
been obtained. Recently, in Ross, the Court refined the test by dispensing
with the "sometimes" qualification. 91 Yet Ross has not given us a test
that is even reasonably clear or that yields relatively just and consistent
results.
The first problem is that Ross itself left many questions unanswered.
Does a recreational vehicle, which has the privacy aspects of a house but
the mobility of a car, fall within the automobile exception? 92 Is the scope
of a search incident to arrest greater when one is arrested in an automobile than when one is arrested at home?93 May packages taken from a
vehicle at the time of arrest be searched later without a warrant?94 Finally, there is the question explicitly left open in the Ross decision: what,
after Ross, is the scope of "less than probable cause" searches, such a§
95
inventory searches?
The second problem with Ross is that, in abandoning the warrant
requirement, the Court adopted a new rule that may lead to injustices in
other cases. Prior to Ross, in United States v. Chadwick 9 6 the Court
recognized that "[n]o less than one who locks the doors of his home
against intruders, one who [locks his possessions in a footlocker] is due
the protection of the Fourth Amendment .. .. ,97 The placement of a
90. In Chambers, the Court suggested that a search of a car, even on probable cause, is not
always justified without a warrant. Chambers, 399 U.S. at 50.
91. Ross, 456 U.S. at 825.
92. The Court, in California v. Carney, 105 S.Ct. 2066, 2070 (1985), held that a mobile home
was to be treated like a car rather than a house for fourth amendment purposes.
93. The Court answered this question affirmatively in New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 46061 (1981) (holding that policeman who has made lawful custodial arrest of occupant of automobile
may search the passenger compartment, and discussing prior holding that policeman could not
search all drawers in arrestee's home simply because the arrest occurred at home). In the process,
however, the Court left a new series of unanswered questions. See 2 W. LAFAVE, supra note 75,
§ 7.1, at 206-14 (Supp. 1985).
94. See United States v. Johns, 105 S.Ct. 881, 885-87 (1985) (officers may conduct warrantless
search of suspected marijuana-laden packages even though search does not take place immediately
upon seizure of vehicles in which packages were found).
95. See Ross, 456 U.S. at 809 n. 1 ("Many of these searches do not require a showing of probable cause
We are not called upon to-and do not-consider in this case the scope of the
warrantless search that is permitted in those cases.").
96. 433 U.S. 1 (1977).
97. Id. at 11.
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suitcase or footlocker in a car did not diminish its privacy protection. 98
After Ross, every such container found in a car may be subject to

search, 99 notwithstanding Chadwick's recognition that such warrantless
intrusions constitute serious invasions of personal privacy. This result
was reached because the Court believed clear rules were necessary in this
area, even at the expense of the "reasonable expectation of privacy" that

had previously been the (troublesomely flexible) basis of fourth amendment protections. Greater clarity always means that some potentially
important factors must be ignored. Thus the automobile exception,
which was originally developed to allow a flexible response in place of the
mechanistic warrant requirement where the police behavior seemed rea-

sonable, has developed a life of its own as a mechanistic rule. 100
The problems with the automobile exception can be found throughout fourth amendment law. Another example is the "search incident to
arrest" exception to the warrant requirement. This doctrine permits an

arrestee and "the area within his immediate control" to be subject to a
warrantless search for weapons and evidence. 101 A myriad of questions
arises. May such searches be conducted without at least some suspicion
98. See Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 765 (1979) ("We therefore find no justification for
the extension of [the automobile exception] to the warrantless search of one's personal luggage
merely because it was located in an automobile lawfully stopped by the police.").
99. See Ross, 456 U.S. at 824 ("The scope of a warrantless search of an automobile thus is not
defined by the nature of the container in which the contraband is secreted. Rather, it is defined by
the object of the search and the places in which there is probable cause to believe that it may be
found."). The container will be subject to search unless the police have waited for the container that
they wanted to search to be put into a car. Arkansas v. Sanders apparently still maintains sufficient
vitality to prevent this practice. See Kamisar, United States v. Ross: The Court Takes Another Look
at the Container-in-the-CarSituation, in J. CHOPER, Y. KAMISAR, & L. TRIBE, THE SUPREME
COURT: TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENTS

1981-82, at 71, 83.

100. Even if, in a particular case, it would not seem reasonable to search a car and its contents
without a warrant, the automobile exception has created a new rule that can be applied mechanically
to render patently unreasonable behavior "reasonable" under the fourth amendment:
Suppose the police suspect A of committing a crime on a particular date. They have probable cause to believe that a suitcase belonging to B, which is locked in the trunk of B's car,
which is parked in front of B's house, contains B's locked diary, which has references toA's
whereabouts on that date. Under the automobile exception, the police, having only probable cause, may conduct a warrantless search of the car for the suitcase and the suitcase for
the diary even though they have no reason to believe that the car is about to be moved. Yet
there are few instances in which one would have a greater expectation of privacy than in a
locked diary in a locked suitcase in the locked trunk of one's own car parked in front of
one's own house.
Bradley, supra note 71, at 1478 (footnotes omitted). It is clear that a car parked in such a "public
place" is subject to the automobile exception. See Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 593 (1974)
(plurality opinion); see also Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 559 (1978) (innocent third
parties are not exempt from searches of their premises for evidence).
101. See, e-g., Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969) (police may search arrestee and
area within his immediate control).
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that evidence will be found? 10 2 May all containers possessed by an arrestee be searched incident to arrest? 10 3 What about a container abandoned
just prior to the arrest? What about the automobile in which a person
was arrested? 104 Professor LaFave devotes over sixty pages of his treatise
to questions raised by the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine, 0 5 and the
Supreme Court admits, with modest understatement, that "courts have
10 6
discovered the principle difficult to apply in specific cases."'
Obviously, no policeman on the street (or magistrate or court) can
have a clear grasp of the doctrine. Consequently the police will make
many errors that will either be punished by the courts through the exclusionary rule or will be overlooked-though the Supreme Court theoretically demands that all such errors be punished. Decisions will tend to be
made on an ad hoc basis, according to the judge's view of what is just,
what the rules "really" demand, how "bad" the defendant is, how much
the judge likes the police, or other irrelevant and unpredictable factors
that stray from the main point of the fourth amendment-that the search
must be reasonable.'0 7 The vagaries of the current rule drive courts to
adopt one of two alternative undesirable approaches: either slavish adherence to the letter of the rule despite unjust results, or ad hoc and
unprincipled tinkering with the rule to make it appear that the rule commanded the result that the Court desired to reach.
B.

The Obscenity Cases.

Obscenity is another area of the law where the Court has tinkered
for years without ever producing a cogent doctrine. From 1957 to 1973
the Court decided a series of cases in which it tried to define "obscenity,"1108 only, in the words of Professor Laurence Tribe, to produce "a
102. See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973) ("A custodial arrest of a suspect
based on probable cause is a reasonable intrusion under the Fourth Amendment; that intrusion being
lawful, a search incident to the arrest requires no additional justification.").
103. See 2 W. LAFAvE, supranote 75, § 5.2(j), at 301 (answering this question in the negative).
104. See New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 (1981) (yes).
105. See 2 W. LAFAvE, supra note 75, §§ 5.2, 7.1 (discussing police powers to search persons
and places incident to an arrest) .
106. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 458 (1981).
107. For a discussion of the uncertainty inherent in the open field doctrine, see Bradley, supra
note 71, at 1479-80.
108. See Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 73-83 (1973) (Brennan, J.,dissenting).
Brennan stated: "No other aspect of the First Amendment has, in recent years, demanded so substantial a commitment of our time, generated such disharmony of views, and remained so resistant to
the formulation of stable and manageable standards." Id. at 73. Brennan discussed Roth v. United
States, 354 U.S. 476, 489 (1957) (adopting as a test for judging obscenity "whether to the average
person, applying contemporary community standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a
whole appeals to prurient interest"), A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of
Pleasure" v. Attorney Gen. of Mass., 383 U.S. 413, 418 (1966) (applying a three-part test: dominant
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The lack of

doctrine,1 10

significant change in the Court's obscenity
announced in
1973 in Miller v. California,'"t is due less to a final resolution of issues by
the Court than to the Court's decision simply to stop tinkering with the

test."12 Moreover, as Justice Harlan observed in 1968, the process of
tinkering with the doctrine has produced no gains comparable to those
arguably achieved in Brown v. Board of Education: 13 "The upshot of all

this divergence in viewpoint is that anyone who undertakes to examine
the Court's decisions since Roth which have held particular material ob-

4
scene or not obscene would find himself in utter bewilderment.""
Could the Court have established a test in the obscenity cases that

could have been consistently applied in new cases? I think not. The easi-

est view to apply consistently is the absolutist position of Justices Black
and Douglas that the first amendment protects all speech, including
speech that the Court may deem obscene. 1 5 Under this view, no governmental efforts to regulate obscenity would be constitutional. But this ap-

proach, as even Justice Brennan concedes, would strip "the States of
power to an extent that cannot be justified by the commands of the Contheme, offensiveness, and social value of the material), and Redrup v. New York, 386 U.S. 767, 77071 (1967) (per curiam decision holding disputed materials not to be obscene regardless of which of
the enumerated tests is applied), as cases reflecting disagreement, rather than consensus, on an appropriate test for determining whether or not material is obscene. ParisAdult Theatre, 413 U.S. at
78-83 (Brennan, J., dissenting). According to Justice Brennan, the Court had "failed to formulate a
standard that sharply distinguishes protected from unprotected speech." Id. at 80-83 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
109. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-16, at 656 (1978). For a discussion of
the progress of the obscenity decisions from Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957), to Miller v.
California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973), see L. TRIBE, supra, at 660-70.
110. The test announced in Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973), requires the trier of fact to
consider:
(a) whether "the average person, applying contemporary community standards" would
find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest...; (b) whether the
work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined
by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious
literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.
Id. at 24 (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 489 (1957)).
111. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
112. See G. GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1368-73 (10th ed.
1980). For example, "Hamlingv. United States, 418 U.S. 87 (1974), illustrates the modern Court's
recurrent struggles with the problem of the proper scope of the community whose standards govern
in obscenity cases." G. GUNTHER, supra,at 1368 n.2. The Court in a 5-4 decision opted for defining
"community" standards of obscenity as meaning local rather than statewide or national standards.
Id. Obviously, the Miller test, with phrases such as "contemporary community standards" and
"patently offensive," has not settled the issue. See supra note 110.
113. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
114. Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. Dallas, 390 U.S. 676, 707 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
115. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 513 (1957) (Douglas, J., joined by Black, J.,
dissenting).
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stitution." 116 More importantly for this discussion, it would not have
solved any doctrinal problems. As soon as the Court announced such an
expansive view of "freedom of speech," it would have been beset by cases
involving child pornography, flashers asserting a constitutional right to
expose themselves, and people shouting "Fire!" in crowded theaters, so
that even the most strong-stomached civil libertarian on the Court would
have had to admit that a line had to be drawn somewhere.11 7 Yet, as
Justice Brennan conceded in 1973 after trying to draw such a line for
nearly two decades:
Any effort to draw a constitutionally acceptable boundary on state
power must resort to such indefinite concepts as "prurient interest,"
"patent offensiveness," "serious literary value" and the like. The
meaning of these concepts necessarily varies with the experience, outlook and even idiosyncrasies of the person defining them. [Any standard is subject to] the further complication that the obscenity of any
particular item may depend
upon nuances of presentation and the con1
text of its dissemination.' 8
Justice Brennan failed to perceive the limits of his logic, however,
and proposed yet another test: "[A]t least in the absence of distribution
to juveniles or obtrusive exposure to unconsenting adults, the First and
Fourteenth Amendments prohibit the State and Federal Governments
from attempting wholly to suppress sexually oriented materials on the
basis of their allegedly 'obscene' contents." 119 But this test, too, would
present intractable line-drawing problems, as governmental officials continued their quest for a smut-free America and as the purveyors of pornography searched for ever more disgusting material to tempt the jaded
palates of their customers. Does putting a "No one under 21 admitted"
sign on the door of a book and magazine store solve the problem of distribution to juveniles? What is the meaning of the qualifying word
"wholly" in Justice Brennan's test? Apparently some suppression is appropriate. How much? What about "kiddy porn"? Justice Brennan recently agreed that the states could forbid this in the interests of the child
116. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 103 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (rejecting
view of Black and Douglas that first amendment bars suppression of sexually oriented expression).
117. See, e.g., Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877

(1963). Professor Emerson notes:
Proponents of the "absolute" or "literal" interpretation of the first amendment have failed
to define the bounds of their position or to account for such apparent exceptions to the
absolute test as the law of libel, the application of child labor laws to the distribution of
literature, and the regulation of election campaigns.
Id. at 877.
118. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 84 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
119. Id. at 113. Professor Tribe offers a version of Justice Brennan's scheme, allowing regulation
of obscenity and other speech, "in the interest of unwilling viewers, captive audiences, young children, and beleaguered neighborhoods." L. TRIBE, supra note 109, § 12-16, at 662.
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participants. 120 Is a fourteen-year-old a "child"? Why not limit other
pornography in the interests of the adult participants? Or in recognition
121
of evidence that pornography causes men to abuse women?
To say that the tests advanced by the Court and others will not
provide certainty and will continue to produce litigation is not to say that
they are bad tests. They may succeed in focusing litigation on the proper
issues and in producing reasonably just results in most cases. If one assumes that there should be a test for obscenity, then one or more of these
tests may well be the best we can do. Yet any attempt to formulate a rule
or a test-particularly a new test-will result in virtually endless litigation and, to the extent that the test is strictly applied, some unjust results.
Thus it is fair to ask whether any test should be promulgated at all.
Although the Court's doctrine in the obscenity cases is certainly "unconvincing," as Professor Tribe observes, it has proved to be stable, because
the Court stopped tinkering with the definition in 1973. There is value in
such stability even if it is based on defective or ambiguous doctrine. In
the 1956-57 Term of the Supreme Court, the year in which Roth v.
United States 122 was decided, there were five petitions before the Court
presenting issues relating to obscenity.1 23 In the 1972-73 Term, when
Miller v. California124 was decided, that number had risen to 110.125
Since then the number of cases has tapered off, shrinking to sixty-seven
in the 1975-76 Term 12 6 and thirty-five in the 1981-82 Term. 1 27 Although
the number of petitions to the Court does not necessarily coincide with
the overall amount of litigation, it does serve as a good barometer. These
figures support the notion that the process of decision, rather than the
content, influences the Supreme Court's docket.
The only way to achieve truly stable doctrine, however, is to have no
test at all: to engage in case-by-case balancing, declaring that a given
regulation of speech is or is not reasonable given the value of the material
to be regulated. Such a non-test would render every case fact-specific
and thus reduce the temptation for the Court to decide a particular case
in order to refine or explain its "test." Although the Court has claimed
120. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 776 (1982) (Brennan, J., concurring).
121. But see American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 324-25, 329 & n.2 (7th Cir.
1985) (invalidating, on first amendment grounds, ordinance that prohibited dissemination of pornography-"graphic sexually explicit subordination of women, whether in pictures or in words"-while
accepting legislative judgment that pornography leads to "injury at home, battery and rape").
122. 354 U.S. 576 (1957).
123. See FinalSupreme Court Index, Topical Index, 1956-57 Term, 25 U.S.L.W. 18 (1957),
124. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
125. See FinalSupreme Court Index, Topical Index, 1972-73 Term, 42 U.S.L.W, 44-45 (1973).
126. See Final Supreme Court Index, Topical Index, 1975-76 Term, 44 U.S.L.W. 47 (1976).
127. See FinalSupreme Court Index, Topical Index, 1981-82 Term, 51 U.S.L.W. 61-62 (1982).
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to do this in other first amendment cases, 128 it has insisted on declaring
rules or formulas by which the balancing is to be performed and on explaining its decisions in terms of past precedents. This approach yields
the same result as any other test applicable to all future cases-confusion. The only workable ad hoe balancing is a kind that the Court has
never been willing to undertake: a simple listing of the factors weighed
and the result.
If the Court is unwilling to engage in such balancing, the next best
course is simply to leave the doctrine alone. A degree of stability will be
achieved by the continued application of the same test. Given that any
new test is unlikely to be more effective than the old test, this is an appealing course.
C.

The Commercial Speech Cases.

The commercial speech cases also exemplify the Court's inability to
resolve issues in an area that some would argue was better left alone.' 2 9
130
In Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Consumers Council,
the Court abandoned the long-held view that commercial speech is not
entitled to first amendment protection,1 31 labeling that position "simplistic."'1 32 The Court indicated, however, that it was unwilling to grant
33
commercial speech the same protection as noncommercial speech.1
Virginia Pharmacy thus raised questions regarding what speech was now
protected, what the degree of protection might be, and whether the same
degree of protection would apply to all types of commercial speech. In
Bates v. State Bar of Arizona,'3 4 the Court held that the commercial
speech protections of Virginia Pharmacyprecluded state bar prohibitions
on lawyer advertising. 35 However, in Ohralik v. Ohio State BarAssocia128. See discussion of Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, infra notes 284-89 and accompanying

text.
129. See, eg., Emerson, FirstAmendment Doctrine and the Burger Court, 68 CALIF. L. REv.
422, 458-59 (1980) (the Court originally excluded commercial speech from the first amendment, but
25 years later scrapped the entire commercial speech doctrine); Jackson & Jeffries, Commercial
Speech: Economic Due Process and the FirstAmendment, 65 VA. L. REv.1, 1-5 (1979) (arguing that
doctrine of commercial speech was sufficiently settled at time Court rejected the entire doctrine).

130. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
131. See Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942) (first amendment does not protect
purely commercial speech against government regulation).
132. Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 759.
133. Id. at 771 n.24 ("Even if the differences [between commercial and noncommercial speech]
do not justify the conclusion that commercial speech is valueless, and thus subject to complete suppression by the State, they nonetheless suggest that a different degree of protection is necessary to
ensure that the flow of truthful and legitimate commercial information is unimpaired.").

134. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
135. Id. at 365, 384.
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tion 136 the Court held that in-person solicitation of clients by lawyers (socalled "ambulance chasing") could be forbidden despite the fact that the

solicitation in question was not deceptive or harmful.137 Prophylactic
rules were deemed appropriate. 138 The Court continued in this vein in

Friedman v. Rogers, 139 where it upheld a Texas law that prohibited the
practice of optometry under a trade name. 14 0 In a footnote to its opinion, the Court observed: "[O]ur decisions dealing with more traditional

First Amendment problems do not extend automatically to this as yet
14 1
uncharted area."'

In all, the Court has decided nine commercial speech cases since
Virginia Pharmacy.142 It has promulgated a three-part test for determin-

ing whether speech is commercial, 143 and a four-part test for determining
whether commercial speech may be suppressed. 144 As one commentator

has noted:
The difficulty with the Court's analysis [in the commercial speech

cases] ... is that at no point during its legal wanderings has it ever
articulated sturdy rationales to support its holdings. Instead, it has
seemed to decide each case on its facts, deciding first
the desired results
14 5
and manipulating-or creating-doctrine to fit.
Thus the Court exchanged a "simplistic" doctrine that had not, in Pro-

fessor Emerson's view, been difficult to apply in practice, 146 for an "in136. 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
137. Id. at 468.
138. Id. at 464-68.
139. 440 U.S. 1 (1979).
140. Id. at 15.
141. Id. at I1n.9.
142. See J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 934-43, 986-88 (2d ed.
1983) and cases discussed therein.
143. Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 66-67 (1983) (factors relevant to whether
speech is "commercial" include: whether the speech is an advertisement, whether it refers to specific
product, and whether it has an economic motivation).
144. In Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980), the
Supreme Court applied a four-part test to determine whether a regulation banning or suppressing
commercial speech was valid. Id. at 566. The Court stated:
At the outset, we must determine whether the expression is protected by the First Amendment. For commercial speech to come within that provision, it at least must concern lawful activity and not be misleading. Next, we ask whether the asserted governmental

interest is substantial. If both inquiries yield positive answers, we must determine whether
the regulation directly advances the governmental interest asserted, and whether it is not
more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest.
Id.
145. Note, ConstitutionalProtectionof CommercialSpeech, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 720, 720 (1982);
see also Cox, The Supreme Court 1979 Term, Freedom ofExpression in the Burger Court, 94 HARV.
L. REV. 1 (1980).

146. T. EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 105 n.46 (1966)
("The principles governing commercial speech, and the relations between this sector and the area of
free expression, have never been worked out.").
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consistent" doctrine 47 based on ad hoe balancing. 148 "There is a serious
question... whether the gain, if any, is worth the cost."' 149
Of course, to the extent that the doctrinal problems in this area are
simply the result of a series of poor decisions, then the commercial
speech cases do not support my premise. It would be unreasonable to
ask that a Justice vote to deny certiorari because he can foresee that he
and his colleagues will not be able to deal competently with a given subject matter. When the Court decided Virginia Pharmacy, it undoubtedly
recognized that it was going to stir up litigation on the questions left
unanswered by that opinion. Presumably, however, the majority anticipated that they would be able to clarify matters eventually. Instead, the
Justices wrote nine more opinions in the next nine years, only to end up
with a doctrine widely condemned by commentators as inconsistent' 5 0
and as giving little guidance to government on regulation of commercial
speech.
Could these cases have been decided in a way that would have
brought clarity to this area while pushing the doctrine in the direction
desired by the Court? Again, I argue that they could not. Professor
Emerson suggests three reasons why these decisions failed: (1) commercial speech has historically been treated on an entirely different basis than
all other forms of communication; (2) it is unlikely that commercial
speech will fit into the system of freedom of expression at all because it
does not promote the same values; and (3) "changing the earlier rule
poses certain dangers to the system of freedom of expression."' 15 1 Professor Emerson suggests that the Court's effort to blur the distinction between commercial and noncommercial speech was bound to fail and that
the Court should have retained the old rule that commercial speech is
not protected by the first amendment.
147. Cox, supra note 145, at 31 (inconsistency marks the Burger Court's decisions concerning
commercial speech).
148. Id. at 26 ("The Court paid little attention to building a systematic body of law, but instead
engaged in particularistic and pragmatic balancing.") (emphasis added). But the Court did not engage in the sort of pure ad hoe balancing that this article advocates.
149. Emerson, supra note 129, at 460. Professor Emerson concludes that "separate treatment of
commercial speech would seem to better serve the system of freedom of expression than the course
taken by the Burger Court." Id. at 461.
150. In addition to the discussions already cited, see supra notes 102-08, 129, the two most
recent decisions in this area have also been criticized by commentators. Regarding Metromedia, Inc.
v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981), it was observed that the "Court's decisions raise more
questions than the case settles."
. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & 3. YOUNG, supra note 142, at 988.
Regarding Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60 (1983), one commentator noted that

"the Court continued the imprecision and confusion surrounding the commercial speech doctrine."
Note, ConstitutionalLaw-FirstAmendment-Protection of CommercialSpeech-Bolger v. Youngs
Drug Prods. Corp., 32 U. KAN. L. REv.679, 696 (1984).
151. Emerson, supra note 129, at 460.

24
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Although Professor Emerson's analysis of the problems with the
Virginia Pharmacy rule is correct as far as it goes, it misses the main
point-that no alternative resolution would have produced more satisfactory results. The old system-in which speech was branded as either
unprotected commercial speech or protected noncommercial speechwas clearly unsatisfactory. 152 It drew a line where there was little justification for drawing it and encouraged states to ban "commercial" advertisements for products that they disliked, such as the advertisement
15 3
promoting legal, out-of-state abortions in Bigelow v. Virginia.
Another thoughtful theory for resolving the flaws in the commercial
speech doctrine has been advanced by Professor Daniel Farber.1 54 Farber suggests that a given example of commercial speech may be considered as constituting "part of the contractual arrangement between buyer
and seller" as well as serving "an informative function to which the first
amendment applies."1 55 State rules "relat[ing] to the contractual function.., should not be subjected to the intensive scrutiny required when a
regulation directly implicates the first amendment function of language." 1 56 In his analysis, Farber relies on United States v. O'Brien,1 57
the draft card burning case, in which the Court stated that "government
regulation is sufficiently justified if it ...furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated
to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on
alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the
152. See, eg., Coase,Advertising and Free Speech, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 21 (1977) (concluding
that Supreme Court had to declare either all commercial speech or no commercial speech protected
because deciding where to draw the line was impossible, and that the Court could not logically hold
that no commercial speech was protected); Millstein, The Federal Trade Commission and FalseAdvertising, 64 COLUM. L. Rv.439, 462-64 (1964) (noting that the standard for declaring commercial
speech not to be constitutionally protected is lower than that for declaring pornography unprotected,
and quoting Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 514 (1959) (Douglas, J., concurring) for the
proposition that profit motive should not control whether speech is protected); Redish, The First
Amendment in the Marketplace: Commercial Speech and the Values of Free Expression, 39 GEo.
WASH. L. REV. 429, 452 (1971) (arguing that the primary purpose doctrine (i.e., determining
whether speech is protected on the basis of whether its primary purpose is commercial or noncommercial) violates listeners' first amendment right to acquire information and unduly limits scope of
protection accorded to periodicals, books, and newspapers).
153. 421 U.S. 809 (1975). The Court struck down the statute in Bigelow on the theory that the
commercial speech doctrine did not mean that "all statutes regulating commercial advertising are
immune from constitutional challenge." Id. at 820. Because the advertisement in Bigelow "conveyed information of potential interest and value to a diverse audience" and "pertained to constitutional interests," it could not be banned. Id. at 822, 824-25.
154. Farber, CommercialSpeech and FirstAmendment Theory, 74 Nw. U.L. REv. 372 (1979).
155. Id. at 387.
156. Id.
157. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
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furtherance of that interest."15 8 Farber does not advance this approach
as a panacea for the ills of the commercial speech doctrine, but he does

claim that it provides "greater clarity, which is ultimately the most any
theory can offer."' 159 Unconstrained by the need to mold an opinion that

will attract at least four other votes, Farber probably has achieved

"greater clarity" than the Court. Yet his test-like any other theorycannot be considered "clear."
The first problem with the "contractual approach" is that, in Farber's initial statement of it, it depends on the "function of the language" 60 of the advertisement; in contrast, O'Brien focuses on the nature
of the governmental interest being asserted, not on the nature of the
speech. Suppose a city, for aesthetic reasons, wanted to ban all billboards, including those that clearly qualified for first amendment protection.1 6 1 The language in O'Brien, emphasizing the nature of the
governmental interest being asserted, would seem to permit such a ban
without subjecting it to strict scrutiny.' 62 But this regulation also "directly implicates the first amendment function of language,"' 163 which
would suggest that it must be strictly scrutinized under Farber's test.

The problem with Farber's test is that it is frequently impossible to distinguish between the "contractual" and "informative" functions of a par-

ticular form of speech, just as it is impossible to distinguish consistently
between protected noncommercial and unprotected commercial speech.
Farber himself presents the example of an advertisement by an association of egg producers that misrepresents the scientific evidence on the
allegedly harmful effects of cholesterol. Farber quickly concludes that

"[t]he misrepresentation can reasonably be seen as affecting the contract
of sale, giving consumers a possible cause of action for breach of war158. Id. at 377.
159. Farber, supra note 154, at 408.

160. Id. at 387.
161. This was close to the issue presented in Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490
(1981). Chief Justice Burger claimed that the plurality "hint[ed]-and not too subtly," that such an
ordinance would be unconstitutional, a result that he termed "insensitive to the needs of the modern
urban dweller and devoid of valid constitutional foundations." Id. at 564 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
162. See O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 376-77 ("This Court has held that when 'speech' and 'nonspeech'
elements are combined in the same course of conduct, a sufficiently important governmental interest
in regulating the nonspeech element can justify incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms.... [A] government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power of
the Government; if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental
interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged
First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest."). In
Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981), the Court deferred to the City's conclusion that a billboard ban would promote aesthetic interests as well as traffic safety: "There is nothing
here to suggest that these judgments are unreasonable." Id. at 509.
163. Farber, supra note 154, at 387.
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ranty."' 164 This may be true, but this advertisement also seems to be performing or purporting to perform an informative function-albeit one
intended to benefit the commercial interests of the advertiser. To call
this advertisement "contractual" and therefore "suppressible" does not
seem to clarify one of the basic problems with the commercial speech
cases: if commercial speech is protected by the first amendment, how
and to what extent may false or misleading advertising be regulated?
The commercial speech cases illustrate the perpetual dilemma of the
Court. If its opinions are, in fact, intended to resolve future disputes by
giving guidance to lower courts, legislatures, and executive bodies, then it
must draw reasonably clear lines. The old commercial speech doctrine
was such a line. However, such lines inevitably lead to unjust results in
individual cases and often do not comport precisely with the constitutional provision they are designed to implement. Consequently, cases
arise where the Court, as in Bigelow, must tinker with the line, declaring
that the line is no longer as straight and clear as had been believed. Once
the Court does this, there is no logical justification for having the line at
all. In Virginia Pharmacy the Court recognized that commercial speech
frequently conveys information of potential interest and value to a diverse audience, and hence that it should be constitutionally protected,
but not totally free from regulation. 165 The Court soon realized, however, that there are problems with having no lines. People become confused about the meaning of legal rules, and there is a litigation explosion.
The Court then hears more cases in the area, but matters only become
more confused. Finally, it either adopts a new doctrine with the same
fundamental problems that the old one had, continues to decide cases on
an ad hoc basis, or perhaps just refuses to decide any more cases in the
area, leaving matters where they are. The process is similar to that of
law faculties searching for the ideal first-year curriculum. Everyone realizes at one level that such an ideal is unattainable, but every decade or so
the curriculum is altered only to produce several years of upheaval and
no more satisfactory results. The same process will probably occur in the
commercial speech area: having announced three- and four-part tests for
determining whether or not speech is commercial and, if so, whether it
can be regulated, the Court will soon bow out of this area. Even though
everyone agrees that these tests are far from ideal, experience has shown
that if the Court lets the matter rest, litigation will gradually subside. As
Justice Brandeis observed, "in most matters it is more important that the
164. Id. at 390.
165. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 764,

770-73 (1976).

Vol. 1986:1]

THE UNCERTAINTY PRINCIPLE

applicable rule of law be settled than that it be settled right." 166 The
alternative is to continue the search for the holy grail of doctrinal stability, with each new crusade only putting the goal further out of reach.
II.

THEMES OF LIMITATION

To this point, this article has been limited to a series of examples of
how repeated efforts by the Court to promulgate a test or rule in constitutional cases have generally provoked litigation and confusion and have
not promoted doctrinal clarity. Although doctrinal uncertainty is, in
some cases, the product of the changing composition of the Court, the
inevitability of uncertainty is institutional. There are at least five reasons
for the inevitability of confusion and incomprehensibility: the gray area
problem, the "tyranny" of the majority opinion, the "case or controversy" limitation, the principle of stare decisis, and the dichotomy between a clear rule and a flexible response. All of these difficulties are
rather obvious, but the full range of the problems that they cause, and
the way in which the difficulties interact, may not be.
A.

Gray Areas.

Lines can be clearly drawn on a surface. Thus the boundary between East and West Berlin can be determined with virtual certainty, so
that one who steps over the line will be shot. Even such physical lines
can be uncertain when, for example, they are defined in terms of a river
whose banks are constantly shifting. When concepts are to be separated
by a verbal "line," then both the concepts to be divided and the line to be
used in the division are subject to the inherent vagueness of language.
Thus we can say with certainty where East Berlin stops and West Berlin
starts, but we cannot be certain in speaking of economic activity, where
communism stops and capitalism begins.
Despite its recognition that "[m]any constitutional standards involve 'undoubted gray areas,' "167 the Supreme Court occasionally loses
track of this obvious point and purports to achieve, or at least approach,
"clear lines," "certainty," or some equally unattainable goal. 168 Even the
166. Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,dissenting).
167. Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Auth., 105 S. Ct. 1005, 1012 (1985) (quoting
Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 558 (1975) (Rehnquist, J.,dissenting)).
168. See, eg., Michigan v. Clifford, 464 U.S. 287 (1984). In Clifford, the Court granted certiorari to "clarify doubt that appears to exist as to the application of our decision in [Michigan v.]
Tyler," in which the Court created a new fourth amendment exception for fire investigations. Id. at
289. In dissent, four Justices averred: "[Tioday's opinion, far from clarifying the doubtful aspects of
Tyler, sows confusion broadside." Id. at 306 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). See also United States v.
Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 799-800 (1982) (extending the automobile exception of Carroll v. United States,
267 U.S. 132 (1925), to containers and packages located in the car).
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brightest line has gray areas surrounding it. Moreover, bright lines may
yield unpalatable results, causing the Court to modify the rules. The
Court is often reluctant, however, to admit that the line has been
changed. Observers are then left to wonder whether the first case or the
second is to be consulted for the true definition of the rule. Both cases
will be cited to support contradictory results.
B.

The Tyranny of the Majority Opinion.

When a Supreme Court Justice joins an opinion, the most he or she
can expect is to agree with the result and the broad outlines of that opinion. It may be impolitic or impossible to quibble with every point made
by the author, even though the joining Justice almost invariably will not
agree with all of them. In a number of dissenting opinions, for example,
Justice Rehnquist has expressed the view that a case-by-case "reasonableness" approach would be the best way to deal with fourth amendment
cases. 169 Yet, in the recent case of Oliver v. United States,170 he joined an
opinion that contained a paragraph vigorously condemning such an approach.17 1 Presumably he liked the majority decision better than the dissent and was unable, or unwilling, or did not have time, to convince the
author to leave out the paragraph in question.
Consequently, though a majority opinion purports to "speak for"
five or more Justices, particular statements made in the opinion may not
represent the opinion of all of these Justices. When one of the joining
Justices has an opportunity to address the issue in another case, that Justice will probably slant it somewhat toward his or her own viewpoint,
never conceding that this represents a departure from the previous decision. And, for the same reasons previously discussed, the author of the
original opinion is likely to acquiesce in this distortion provided it is not
too severe. Obviously, the potential for uncertainty in this process is
great.
C. Cases or Controversies.
The case-or-controversy limitation is a constitutional one, stemming
from article III, which states that "the judicial power shall extend" to a
169. See, eg., Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 528-29 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("The
question we must decide is what was unreasonableabout the steps which these officers took with
respect to this suspect in the Miami Airport on this particular day.").
170. 466 U.S. 170 (1984).
171. Id at 181-82.
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variety of "cases" and "controversies."'' 7 2 As Professor Lea Brilmayer
has observed, "[t]he wording [of article III] has traditionally been understood to include the power to resolve abstract legal issues, including constitutional issues, but only as a necessary byproduct of the resolution of
173
particular disputes between individuals."
This is an extraordinary limitation, given that the stated purpose of
the certiorari grant, as discussed earlier, is specifically not to resolve disputes between parties but to decide "an important question of federal law
which has not been, but should be, settled by . . . [the Supreme]
Court."' 174 The purpose in granting certiorari is, essentially, to legislate-to declare broad policy that will be applicable nationwide. 175
Thus, the Court, which considers itself principally a "legislative" or
rulemaking body, can only make rules as a by-product of a dispute between parties. It must sit and wait and hope that two parties will bring it
the issue that it wants to decide. 176 Resolving such a case does not read-

ily foster the establishment of a general principle; the statement of the
general principle is limited by the bounds of the individual case. This
limitation leads to several possible results. First, there may be fudging of
the case-or-controversy doctrine as the Court reaches out to decide issues
that are not presented by the case. For example, in the recent cases of

United States v. Leon 177 and Massachusetts v. Sheppard,7 8 the Court
held that it is inappropriate to exclude evidence obtained from an uncon-

179
stitutional search when the police error was made in "good faith."
172. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 ("The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity,
arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under their Authority.").
173. Brilmayer, The Jurisprudenceof Article II: Perspectiveson the "Case or Controversy" Requirement, 93 HARV. L. REv. 297, 300 (1979) (footnote omitted). See, e.g., Chicago & G.T. Ry. v.
Wellman, 143 U.S. 339, 345 (1892) (holding that courts may legitimately call the constitutionality of
legislation into question "only in the last resort, and as a necessity in the determination of real,
earnest and vital controversy between individuals"), quoted with approval in Muskrat v. United
States, 219 U.S. 346, 359 (1911).
174. See Sup. Cr. R. 17.1(c).
175. "[The Supreme Court] is also a political institution, an institution, that is to say, for arriving at decisions on controversial questions of national policy." Dahli, Decision Making in a Democracy, in JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE SUPREME COURT 106 (L. Levy ed.) (1967).
176. See J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 22 (1980), for a discussion of how case-or-controversy limitations in the Slaughter House Cases pushed the Court into a decision that stripped the
privileges and immunities clause of any meaning, which in turn forced the Court to use the less likely
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment as the vehicle for extending the Bill of Rights to the
states.
177. 468 U.S 897 (1984).
178. 468 U.S. 981 (1984).
179. Sheppard, 468 U.S. at 989-90 (police officer is justified in relying upon a judge concerning
validity of a warrant); Leon, 468 U.S. at 926 (finding that officer's affidavit, which was used to obtain
a warrant, was much more than a "bare bones" affidavit).
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Yet Justice Stevens noted that the search, at least in Leon,'8 0 actually
was constitutional under the test announced the previous term in Illinois
v. Gates.'8s Thus there was no need to decide whether certain illegal
searches fell under the "good faith exception," because the search in
question was legal. The Court, charged Stevens, was "reach[ing] out to

decide what is undoubtedly a profound question concerning the administration of criminal justice [without] assuring itself that this question is

actually and of necessity presented by the concrete facts before the
182

Court."

In addition to deciding issues that are not presented, the Court may
distort the issue in order to find the case justiciable. Taylor v. Louisiana,183 for example, involved a challenge by Taylor, a man, to the exclu-

sion of women from the jury venire. 18 4 In order to find that Taylor had
standing, the Court had to define the sixth amendment right to a jury
trial as a right to a jury drawn from a "representative cross-section of the

community" rather than to an unbiased and impartial jury, a definition
1 85
that was highly disputable.

By deciding issues that are not presented, or by misstating the issue
presented in order to avoid the case-or-controversy limitation, the Court

sows confusion about what has been decided and increases the
probability that a future decision will interpret the issue differently than
the first Court intended. In Leon and Sheppard, for example, it is not
180. Leon, 468 U.S. at 961-63 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
181. 462 U.S. 213 (1983). Gates held that the "two pronged" test for determining probable
cause, see Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969), was to be abandoned and that the determination should be grounded on the "totality of the circumstances." Gates, 462 U.S. at 230-39.
182. Leon, 468 U.S. at 963 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The Court enumerated the various limitations on access to courts for constitutional adjudication in Rescue Army v. Municipal Court of Los
Angeles, 331 U.S. 549 (1947):
[Tihis Court has followed a policy of strict necessity in disposing of constitutional issues,
The earliest exemplifications ... arose in the Court's refusal to render advisory opinions
and in applications of the related jurisdictional policy drawn from the case and controversy
limitation....
The policy, however, has not been limited to jurisdictional determinations. For, in
addition, "the Court has developed, for its own governance in the cases confessedly within
its jurisdiction, a series of rules under which it has avoided passing upon a large part of all
the constitutional questions pressed upon it for decision." Thus, as those rules were listed
in support of the statement quoted, constitutional issues affecting legislation will not be
determined in friendly, nonadversary proceedings; in advance of the necessity of deciding
them; in broader terms than are required by the precise facts to which the ruling is to be
applied; if the record presents some other ground upon which the case may be disposed of,
at the instance of one who fails to show that he is injured by the statute's operation, or who
has availed himself of its benefits; or if a construction of the statute is fairly possible by
which the question may be avoided.
Id. at 568-69 (quoting Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 346 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (footnotes omitted)).
183. 419 U.S. 522 (1975).
184. Id. at 524.
185. See id. at 538-43 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (discussing lack of precedent for this view).
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clear what constitutes a "good faith" mistake. Is it only a mistake that
arguably was not a violation at all (as in these cases), or does the concept
include more obvious examples of police misconduct? If a future Court
wanted to limit these cases, it would be easy to say that the definition of a
good-faith mistake is very narrow, though that does not seem to be the
86
intent of the opinions in Leon and Sheppard.1
Finally, the Court may refuse to decide issues that need resolution
simply because the issue is not presented by the parties,18 7 because the
issue is moot, or because the parties lack standing. For example, in
DeFunis v. Odegaard,188 the Court declined to decide whether a law
school's preferential admissions policy for blacks constituted an equal
protection violation of the rights of whites; the Court indicated that the
plaintiff's claim was moot because he had been admitted to and was
about to graduate from law school.' 8 9 It took four more years for the
Court to get a case on this topic that it considered justiciable.190 In other
cases, such as the post-Miranda case of Michigan v. Mosley, 191 the Court
is forced by the facts to decide a narrow issue when a decision on a
broader one would have been much better. In Mosley the police questioned the defendant about a different crime after he asserted his right to
silence with regard to the original crime. 192 The Court upheld the use of
this evidence at trial.193 Much more common, however, is the situation
where the police want to question a suspect with regard to the same
crime after he has invoked his right to silence. Although there are intimations in Mosley that this may sometimes be permissible, 194 the case-orcontroversy doctrine prevented the Court from deciding this issue, and
the question remains unresolved.
The necessity to decide issues that are not presented, as in Sheppard
186. Close attention to [the] remedial objectives [of the exclusionary rule] has characterized
our recent decisions concerning the scope of the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule.
The Court has, to be sure, not seriously questioned, 'in the absence of a more efficacious
sanction, the continued application of the rule to suppress evidence from the [prosecution's] case where a Fourth Amendment violation has been substantial and deliberate....'
Leon, 468 U.S. at 908-09.
187. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 217-24 (1983). The Court in Gates grounded its refusal
to decide whether there was a "good faith exception" to the exclusionary rule, not on article III, but
rather on the Court's statutory authority to review state court decisions, 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1982),
which is limited to "[flinal judgements or decrees renderecf by the highest court of a State." Gates,
462 U.S. at 217 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1982)).
188. 416 U.S. 312 (1974). Four Justices argued that the case was not moot. Id. at 348-50 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
189. Id. at 319-20.
190. See University of California Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 272-81 (1978).
191. 423 U.S. 96 (1975).
192. Id. at 97-98.

193. Id. at 99-107.
194. Id. at 101-04.
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and Leon, to sidestep justiciability issues, 195 as in Taylor, or to forbear
from deciding a case or an issue because of justiciability problems, as in
DeFunisand Mosley, affects the ability of the Court to resolve disputes on
important questions of federal law. When combined with the other limitations on the decisionmaking process, this disability becomes very
significant.
D. Stare Decisis.
When a legislature wishes to declare a new law, or to change an old
one, it simply does so. There is no need to account for the new law in
terms of similar laws that have been passed, or to explain why this new
law is not inconsistent with its predecessors. Not so with the Supreme
Court. When it makes law, the doctrine of stare decisis et non quieta
movere 196 governs the process. Stare decisis is seen as a doctrine that
lends stability and legitimacy to the judicial process: "[T]he labor of
judges would be increased almost to the breaking point if every past decision could be reopened in every case, and one could not lay one's own
course of bricks on the secure foundation of the courses laid by others
197
who had gone before him."'
Whatever the necessity or value of stare decisis,1 98 it unquestionably
interferes with the Supreme Court's stated goal of settling important
questions of federal law.199 This is particularly true in constitutional decisions, where the Court must consider the intent of the framers as well
as, in some cases, nearly two hundred years of precedent. As the Court
adds to the pile of precedents, the problem gets worse. Particularly in
the criminal procedure area, where clearly settled law is of the utmost
importance, stare decisis makes such clear settlement virtually impossible. Justice Stevens noted that as "the body of precedent continues to
grow year after year, the likelihood that doctrinal inconsistency may
force the Court to reject one precedent in favor of another must likewise
195. See also Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1972), where, in order to find a case
non justiciable, the Court took what islarguably an unduly narrow view of what constituted "present
objective harm" to the plaintiffs, who were the subjects of dossiers compiled by the Army on potential subversives.
196. See Sprecher, The Development of the Doctrine of StareDecisis and the Extent to Which it
Should be Applied, 31 A.B.A. J. 501, 501-02 (1945) (stare decisis provides that courts should stand
by their decisions and should not disturb settled points of law), quoted in Stevens, The Life Span of a
Judge-Made Rule, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 1 & n.1 (1983).
197. B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 149 (1921); see also A. GOLDBERG,

EQUAL JUSTICE 75 (1971) ("[S]tare decisis foster[s] public confidence in the judiciary and public
acceptance of individual decisions by giving the appearance of impersonal, consistent, and reasoned
opinions.").
198. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
199. See SuP. Cr. R. 17.1(c).
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increase. ' '200
Yet the problem is more acute than Justice Stevens recognized in
this passage. Not only may doctrinal inconsistency force the Court to
reject one precedent in favor of another, it may also make it impossible to
establish any clear rules. Because it must be phrased in terms of unclear
and often conflicting precedents and must be based on the issues of a case
presented by the parties, a "new" rule will be imprecise at its inception.
These factors exacerbate the already difficult task of drafting a clear rule.
Consider the Miranda line of cases discussed earlier. 20 1 It is probably fair to say, as the Miranda dissenters did, that "[t]he proposition that
the privilege against self-incrimination forbids in-custody interrogation
without the warnings specified in the majority opinion... has no significant support in the history of the privilege or in the language of the Fifth
Amendment. ' '20 2 Nevertheless, the majority based its decision on a series of earlier cases. Indeed, it stated that the Court granted certiorari
merely "to explore some facets of the problems [raised by Escobedo v.
Illinois23] of applying the privilege against self-incrimination to in-custody interrogation and to give concrete constitutional guidelines for law
enforcement agencies and courts to follow. ' '2° 4 According to the opinion, Miranda "is not an innovation in our jurisprudence, but is an application of principles long recognized and applied in other settings." 2 5
The Court then rounded up the usual precedents-the English Bill of
Rights, Cohens v. Virginia,20 6 and selected passages from more recent
cases-to support its position that Mirandawas a simple, almost inevitable, outgrowth of earlier cases. 20 7 The dissents cited an equally impressive array of cases to show that this case was a radical departure from
what had gone before. 20 8
A few years after Miranda had been decided, the composition of the
209
Court changed and a majority disagreed with the Miranda holding.
200. Stevens, supra note 196, at 4 (citation omitted).
201. See supra notes 44-57 and accompanying text.
202. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 526 (1966) (White, J., dissenting). Similarly, Professor
Saltzburg has termed Miranda an "abrupt departure" from precedent. Saltzburg, Foreword: The
Flow and Ebb of Constitutional CriminalProcedurein the Warren & Burger Courts, 69 GEO. L.J.
151, 200 (1980).
203. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
204. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 441-42.
205. Id. at 442.
206. 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 387 (1821).
207. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 442-44.
208. Id. at 506-14 (Harlan, J., dissenting); id. at 527-31 (White, J., dissenting).
209. See Stone, supra note 55, at 99-100, 99 n.2 (concluding that such an assumption is not
"unduly rash"); cf Burger, Who Will Watch the Watchman? 14 AM. U.L. REV. 1, 12 (1964) (stating, prior to Miranda, that "the notion that suppression of evidence in a given case effectively deters
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Had they not been precluded by stare decisis, they presumably would
have overruled it. This did not occur, for reasons discussed by Professor
Geoffrey Stone:
The task of a court confronted with a precedent that a majority of
its members believe to be seriously misguided or worse is never an easy
one. And the difficulty is exacerbated when that precedent is recent,
highly controversial, and deeply embedded in the public consciousness.
In such a context, the expedient of direct overruling may seem unattractive, for such action would inescapably raise strong doubts about
the integrity and the stability of the judicial process. Faced with this
problem, a court may attempt to avoid or to postpone a direct overruling of the disfavored precedent. The very existence of the conflict,
however, is likely to exert considerable strain on the court in its efforts
to deal forthrightly with issues posed by the precedent. This seems to
be the current plight of the Burger Court with respect to Miranda v.
2
Arizona. 10
Thus, instead of overruling Miranda, the Court in a series of cases
"interpreted" it narrowly. In Harrisv. New York, 211 it held, despite clear
language in Miranda to the contrary, 212 that a statement made without
proper warning could be used to impeach the defendant's testimony at
trial. 2 13 The Harris Court, however, was forced by stare decisis to concede that "Miranda barred the prosecution from making its case [in
chief] with statements of an accused made while in custody prior to having or effectively waiving counsel. ' 2 14 In Michigan v. Tucker 215 the
Court found, contrary to the express holding of Miranda,2 16 that a failure
to give the required warnings did not violate the fifth amendment but
only the "prophylactic rule developed to protect that right. '21 7 The
Court's opinion makes it clear that this holding was not based on any
the future action of the particular policeman or of policemen generally was never more than wishful
thinking on the part of the courts").
210. Stone, supra note 55, at 99 (footnotes omitted).
211. 401 U.S. 222 (1970).
212. "[S]tatements merely intended to be exculpatory by the defendant are often used to impeach his tesimony at trial.... These statements are incriminating in any meaningful sense of the

word and may not be used without the full warnings .. " Miranda,384 U.S. at 477.
213. Comments to the contrary in Mirandawere written off as dictum. Harris,401 U.S. at 224.
See Dershowitz & Ely, Harris v. New York: Some Anxious Observationson the Candorand Logic of

the Emerging Nixon Majority, 80 YALE L.J. 1198, 1208-18 (1971) (detailed analysis of Court's "misleading" use of precedents).
214. Harris,401 U.S. at 224.
215. 417 U.S. 433 (1974).
216. Mirandaheld that the warnings are required by the fifth amendment, "unless we are shown
other procedures which are at least as effective in apprising accused persons of their right[s]."
Miranda,384 U.S. at 467. See also id. at 476 ("The requirement of warnings and waiver of rights is
a fundamental with respect to the Fifth Amendment privilege .. ").For a full discussion of Harris
and Tucker, see Stone, supra note 55, at 106-25.
217. Tucker, 417 U.S. at 439, 444-46.
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misunderstanding of Miranda, but rather on the Court's view of the fifth
2 18
amendment and of the pre-Miranda cases.
How did stare decisis cause uncertainty in the post-Miranda cases?
Harris was a short opinion that relied essentially on two earlier cases,
Miranda and Walder v. United States.21 9 To reach its result in Harris,
the Court found it necessary to dismiss a portion of Miranda as dictum.
This raises questions as to what other parts of that broad opinion, or of
other opinions, are dicta. 220 These questions go to the heart not of the

issue presented, but of the scope of stare decisis itself. Thus, stare decisis
has raised a series of superfluous and endlessly debatable issues about

stare decisis itself.
Perhaps recognizing, as good lawyers, that an argument should be
grounded on more than one footing,2 21 the Harris Court also discussed

Walder. Although a defendant's general denial of culpability could not
be impeached by use of illegally seized evidence,2 22 an affirmative lie by
the defendant could be impeached under Walder.22 3 Because Harris had
not gone beyond a mere denial of guilt in his direct testimony, it would
appear that the Walder exception was inapplicable. In effect, Harris
"construed Walder as holding that unconstitutionally obtained evidence
may always be used to impeach. ' 224 Harrisignored the contrary rule of
2 26
Agnello v. United States,2 25 to which Walder was a narrow exception.
Because Harris was limited to the fact situation then before the

Court, and because precedential support was needed for a decision that,
in fact, was a naked attempt to cut back Miranda,the Court raised questions about the scope of stare decisis and about the meaning of Miranda,
218. The majority opinion reviewed the earlier cases and commentary and concluded that Miranda was the first case to declare "that the Self-Incrimination Clause was applicable to state interrogations at a police station, and that a defendant's statements might be excluded despite their
voluntary character under traditional principles." Id at 443.
219. 347 US. 62 (1954).
220. "[A] technical reading of Miranda, such as that employed in Harris, would enable the
Court to label many critical aspects of the decision mere dictum .... Stone, supra note 55, at 107.
Stone goes on to note that, curiously, the Court never followed this practice again. Id. at 108.
221. Can stare decisis demand less when the pronouncements of an earlier case are to be
ignored?
222. See Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 34-35 (1925).
223. See Walder, 347 U.S. at 65.
224. Stone, supra note 55, at 109.
225. 269 U.S. 20, 34-35 (1925). The Walder Court restated this rule, noting that the defendant
"must be free to deny all the elements of the case against him without thereby giving leave to the
Government to introduce by way of rebuttal evidence illegally secured by it, and therefore not available for its case in chief." Walder, 347 U.S. at 65.
226. "The actual situation was, however, considerably different from that suggested by the
Court. Walder did not state the general rule: instead, it stated a rather special exception to the
general rule laid down in 1925 by a unanimous Supreme Court in the case of Agnello v. United
States." Dershowitz & Ely, supra note 213, at 1211.

36
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Agnello, and Walder. When the additional statements of the Harris
Court itself are added to the constitutional soup, it is obvious that a future Court will be unable to say precisely what Harrismeans.22 7 By purporting to rely on, rather than overrule, Miranda, Agnello, and Walder,
the Court rendered a decision in Harris that was unclear.
The opinion in Tucker was much more complex than the opinion in
Harrisand consequently raised many more questions. I will not attempt
to enumerate all of them, but recognition of even a few will make the
impact of stare decisis clear. The Tucker Court, after discussing the
early cases and the intent of the framers, observed that Miranda was the
first case to find that a defendant's voluntary statement might be excluded at trial. 228 Why is this relevant? Certainly it does not bear on

what the holding in Miranda may have been. Whether Miranda was the
first or twelfth case to so hold has nothing to do with whether the Tucker

Court should follow it. Clearly, this observation in Tucker was homage
to stare decisis. The Court was saying, in effect, "we may cut back on
Miranda because it, not this decision, is out of sync with precedent."

This attitude was perhaps justified by the claim of the Miranda majority
that their decision did follow from the precedents. After finding, contrary to Miranda, that the warnings were not constitutionally compelled, 22 9 the Court in Tucker held that the "fruit of the poisonous tree"
doctrine 230 would not bar testimony of a witness who was discovered
227. Harris raises a number of new issues. For example, what kind of testimony-direct or
cross, outright lies or general denials-may be impeached by what type of evidence-illegally seized
evidence, involuntary statements, or silence? The Court attempted to resolve some of these problems
in United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620 (1980) (defendant's statement made in response to proper
cross-examination reasonably suggested -by defendant's direct examination is subject to proper impeachment by the government, even by evidence that has been illegally obtained and that is otherwise inadmissible on the government's direct case as substantive evidence of guilt), and Jenkins v.
Anderson, 447 U.S. 231 (1980) (holding that use of prearrest silence to impeach a defendant's credibility does not deny him fundamental fifth and fourteenth amendment guarantees of fairness). For a
critical discussion of those cases, see Bradley, Havens, Jenkins, and Salvucci, and the Defendant'r
"Right" to Testify, 18 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 419, 423-36 (1981).
228. Tucker, 417 U.S. at 443.
229. Several commentators have noted the inconsistent approaches in Miranda and Tucker. See,
eg., Stone, supra note 55, at 118-19; cf Oregon v. Elstad, 105 S. Ct. 1285, 1325-26 (1985) (Stevens,
J., dissenting) (suggesting that the Court's power to force state courts to exclude probative selfincriminating statements must rest on the premise that use of such evidence violates the Constitution; otherwise, Miranda and its progeny constitute "an illegitimate exercise of raw judicial
power.").
230. The "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine "is drawn from Wong Sun v. United States, in
which the Court held that evidence and witnesses discovered as a result of a search in violation of the
Fourth Amendment must be excluded from evidence." Oregon v. Elstad, 105 S. Ct. 1285, 1291
(1985). The doctrine also applies "when the fruit of the Fourth Amendment violation is a confession," unless intervening events break the causal link between the violation and the confession. Id.
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only as a result of the defendant's inadequately warned statement. 23 1
However, the Court based its holding in part on the fact that the interrogation in Tucker had occurred before Miranda was decided.2 32 Thus
Tucker did not settle the "poisonous tree" issue for post-Miranda cases.
Obviously, the police could not have followed the specific requirements
of Miranda in this pre-Mirandainterrogation. Discussing the deterrent
effect of the exclusionary rule, the Court observed that "[w]here the official action was pursued in complete goodfaith ... the deterrence rationale loses much of its force. 2 3 3 Nevertheless, the Court noted that the
defendant's own statement (as opposed to the witness's testimony) must
be excluded because Miranda had been declared retroactive in Johnson v.
New Jersey.23 4 Justice Brennan, concurring in the judgment in Tucker,
argued that the ruling in Johnson-thatMiranda was applicable to trials
beginning after Miranda-was "unnecessary to our decision" (i.e., dictum) and should not apply to "fruit of the poisonous tree" cases because
23 5
it would place too great a burden on law enforcement.
Why did the conservative Justice Rehnquist, the author of the
Tucker opinion, accede to a broad reading of Johnson, which rendered
the Mirandaholding more potent,2 36 whereas the liberal Justice Brennan
argued that Miranda should be cut back? The reason, of course, was
stare decisis-not the backward-looking "accounting for precedent" of
most cases, such as Harris,but a forward-looking "establishing of precedent." Justice Rehnquist undoubtedly recognized that by 1974, when
Tucker was decided, a case finding Miranda retroactive (but then denying the defendant relief) would be unimportant because it was unlikely
that many additional pre-Miranda cases would come along. On the
other hand, Tucker was a perfect opportunity to establish a precedential
beachhead for later modification of Warren Court criminal procedure
rules. Thus Tucker held that Miranda was not a constitutional holding
231. "Here we deal... with the testimony of a witness whom the police discovered as a result of
defendant's statements. This recourse to [defendant's] voluntary statements does no violence to such
elements of the adversary system as may be embodied in the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amend-

ments." Tucker, 417 U.S. at 450.
232. See Tucker, 417 U.S. at 447.
233. Id. (emphasis added).
234. Id. at 451 (citing Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966)). The Johnson Court held
that "the non-retroactivity of [Miranda] will not preclude persons whose trials have already been
completed from invoking the same safeguards as part of an involuntariness claim." Johnson, 384

U.S. at 730.
235. Tucker, 417 U.S. at 453-57 (Brennan, J., concurring). Because many lower courts had
found "fruits" admissible in pre-Mirandacases, and the police had relied on those decisions, Justice
Brennan argued that it would be unfair to exclude them. Id. at 457.
236. Justice White, who also disagreed with Miranda, simply found Mirandainapplicable to this
kind of case; thus he agreed with Brennan, though Brennan was a Miranda supporter. See id. at 461.
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but merely a set of prophylactic rules. This did not stop the Court from
finding that Miranda operated to suppress the defendant's improperly
warned statements; but in depriving Miranda of its constitutional basis,
the Court "seems certainly to have laid the groundwork to overrule Miranda. ' 237 At a minimum, Tucker laid a foundation for finding that the
collateral consequences of a Miranda violation would be slight. 238 Perhaps just as important, the statement in Tucker that good faith violations
by the police should not be the basis for evidentiary exclusion was reiterated and expanded by the Court in United States v. Peltier.239 The Peltier
decision, in turn, provided a strong precedential basis for the Court's
holding, ten years later, in United States v. Leon.24° Leon held that there
is a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule where illegal searches
are conducted in "good faith" pursuant to a warrant. 241 All of this
would be possible only if the Court found a Miranda violation in the first
place-hence the seemingly incongruous positions taken by Justices
Rehnquist and Brennan.
Although Justice Rehnquist established in Tucker that he could play
stare decisis like a stringed instrument, he did nothing to clarify the Miranda doctrine. Rather, the adherence to stare decisis, as well as the
expectation of adherence in later cases, caused the Court to distort its
purpose: to overturn Miranda. It also caused the Court to distort the
cases on which it relied, leading to a pyramiding of confusion in the next
case.

24 2

One factor that contributes to the confusion created by stare decisis
is the "lawyer mentality" of the Justices. The writing Justice sees himself
as an advocate who must justify his opinion against that of the dissent. It
237. Stone, supra note 55, at 123.
238. Tucker has been an important precedent for a number of holdings limiting Miranda. See,
e.g., Oregon v. Elstad, 105 S.Ct. 1285, 1292-93 (1984) ("fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine does
not apply to Mirandaviolations); New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 654-55 (1984) ("public safety"
exception to the Mirandarequirements); Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 433-34 (1984) (unwarned admissions to a probation officer do not violate Miranda). Murphy relied on the statement in

Tucker that "every schoolboy is familiar with the concept, if not the language of the [fifth amendment]." Id. at 437 (quoting Tucker, 417 U.S. at 439) (brackets in Murphy).
239. 422 U.S. 531, 539, 542 (1975).

240. 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
241. Id. at 922.

242. There have been many such "next cases" since Tucker. The most recent is Oregon v. El.
stad, 105 S.Ct. 1285 (1985), in which the Court-relying on Tucker's holding that Mirandadid not
declare a constitutional rule-held that the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine did not operate to
suppress the fruits of a statement obtained in violation of Miranda, though the statement itself must

be suppressed. Id. at 1292-93. In dissent, Justice Stevens argued that Elstad was "inconsistent with
the Court's prior cases" (it was inconsistent with Miranda but not with Tucker) and that "the attempt to identify its boundaries in future cases will breed confusion and uncertainty in the administration of criminal justice." Id. at 1323 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
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is hardly surprising that a Justice, with twenty or thirty years of previous
experience as an advocate, should tend to view previous holdings in the
light most favorable to his position. Thus, a Court opinion, as the dissent
and commentators invariably point out, tends to present a slanted view
of the applicable precedents, just as a brief does. Because of stare decisis,
this view becomes the "law" for future cases. Confusion is inevitable, as
cases reaching different outcomes may contain strikingly different interpretations of earlier cases.
E. Clear Rules/Flexible Responses.
In addition to resolution of disputes on major issues, another frequently stated or implied goal of the Supreme Court is clarity in the
law. 24 3 If the Court could set down clear rules for everyone to follow,
then disputes would be minimized and we would all live in harmony. As
previously discussed, it is impossible for the Court to establish clear rules
to govern all future cases because of the case-or-controversy and stare
decisis limitations, as well as the obvious problem that any "clear rule"
will have unclear boundaries. Nevertheless, cases that are clearly governed by a prior holding frequently arise. One might suppose that these
cases would pose no problems, but that is not invariably true. Application of the clear rule to an unforeseen fact situation sometimes leads to
unjust results.
The Supreme Court discovered this when, years ago, it endeavored
to establish a standard "once and for all" regarding "reasonable" conduct of an automobile driver approaching an unmarked railroad crossing-the "stop, look, and listen rule."' 244 The endeavor failed because the
rule led to unjust results when applied to varying fact situations.2 45 After
eight years, the Court abandoned the attempt. 246 It emphasized the
"need for caution in framing standards of behavior that amount to rules
243. See United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 825 (1982) (Blackmun, J., concurring) ("It is

important, however, not only for the Court as an institution, but also for law enforcement officials
and defendants, that the applicable legal rules are clearly established."); see also Oliver v. United
States, 466 U.S. 170, 173, 175 n.5 (1984) (discussion of the need for clear rules in search and seizure

cases).
244. Baltimore & O.R.R. v. Goodman, 275 U.S. 66, 70 (1927).
245. Prosser describes the upshot of the "stop, look, and listen" rule as follows:
A long series of cases in which gates were left open, or the driver relied upon the absence of
a flagman, or it was clear that the conduct specified would have added nothing to the
driver's safety made it quite apparent that no such inflexible rule could be applied.

W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 188-89 (4th ed. 1971) (footnotes omitted).
246. Pokora v. Wabash Ry., 292 U.S. 98, 106 (1934) (footnote omitted) ("The opinion in Goodman's case has been a source of confusion in the federal courts to the extent that it imposes a
standard for application by the judge, and has had only wavering support in the courts of the states.

We limit it accordingly.").
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of law.... Extraordinary situations may not wisely or fairly be subjected
to tests or regulations that are fitting for the common-place or normal." 24 7 William Prosser has elaborated on the problem:

A decision of an appellate cotrt that under certain circumstances a
particular type of conduct is clearly negligent, or that it clearly is not
negligent.... establishes a precedent for other cases where the facts
are identical, or substantially the same. To that extent it may define
the standard of reasonable conduct which the community requires,
Unfortunately the inevitable tendeAcy [is] to crystalize the law into
mechanical rules ... of universal application. Almost invariably the
rule has broken down in the face of the obvious necessity of basing the
standard upon the particular circumstances,
the apparent risk and the
248
actor's opportunity to deal with it.
Yet the Court frequently forgets this experience as it tries to formulate a "clear rule" that will settle an issue once and for all. The "few
specifically established and well-delineated exceptions" 24 9 to the fourth
amendment's warrant requirement have expanded to a total of about
twenty-three. 25 0 The reason for this is simple: The "clear rule" that warrants are always required could never work; exceptions had to be recognized from the beginning.25 1 Originally, the only exception involved
25 2
circumstances where it would be impracticable to obtain a warrant.
This general exception came to be "codified" into a series of more particular exceptions, such as the automobile exception, 253 the search-incident247. Id. at 105-06.
248. W. PROSSER, supra note 245, at 188. The textual discussion of Goodman and Pokora essentially tracks the discussion in Bradley, supra note 71, at 1472, where I previously discussed the clear
rule/flexible response dichotomy.
249. United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 825 (1982) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347, 357 (1967)). See infra notes 273-76 and accompanying text.
250. These are enumerated in Bradley, supra note 71, at 1473-74.
251. As Professor Saltzburg has observed:
Because courts cannot determine with certainty what effect judicial decisions regulating the
admission of evidence have on the behavior of government officials and because overturning a conviction has high social costs, appellate judges naturally may strain, often subconsciously, to preserve a conviction.... [Tjhis straining ... tends to produce precedents that
uphold police activity at the outer margin of permissibility. Often, the approval takes the
form of poorly reasoned opinions. Law enforcement officials rely on the cases that stretch
constitutional principles to their limits and in subsequent cases ask that these principles be

stretched still further.
Saltzburg, supra note 202, at 154-55.
252. See Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699, 708 (1948) ("A search or seizure without a
warrant ...has always been ... strictly limited .... '), quoted with approvalin Chimel v. California,

395 U.S. 752, 758-59 (1969); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 156 (1925) (a warrant must be
obtained if "reasonably practicable").
253. See Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 51 (1970) (warrantless search of vehicle not unreasonable because "opportunity to search is fleeting since a car is readily movable"); Carroll v. United
States, 267 U.S. 132, 152 (1925) (warrantless searches of vehicles with probable cause not unreasonable under fourth amendment because vehicles "can be quickly moved" out of jurisdiction where
warrant would be sought).
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to-arrest exception, 254 and the hot pursuit exception. 25 5 Once the boundaries of these exceptions were set forth, fact situations arose that fell

outside of these exceptions, but in which, in the Court's view, it would
have been unjust to suppress evidence. Such cases led to the creation of

new exceptions, such as the "stop and frisk" exception
larged automobile exception.

257

56

and the en-

Such a factual setting led to the creation

of yet another exception last Term. In New Jersey v. T.L.O., 25s a high
school freshman was caught smoking in a lavatory in violation of school
rules. She was taken to the assistant vice-principal's office where her

purse was searched for cigarettes. Marijuana was found, along with
money, a list, and letters that implicated her in marijuana dealing. This
259
evidence was used in a prosecution of T.L.O. in juvenile court.

In deciding whether this evidence should have been excluded, the
Supreme Court first recognized that the fourth amendment applied to

searches by public school officials and that the defendant had an expectation of privacy in her purse.2 60 On the other hand, the Court found that
"requiring a teacher to obtain a warrant before searching a child...
would unduly interfere with the maintenance of swift and informal disciplinary procedures needed in the schools.1 26 1 In other words, the warrant requirement would lead to unjust results. The Court rejected not
only a warrant requirement for such a search, but also a probable cause

requirement. 262 The new standard for school searches was to be "reasonable suspicion.

'2 63

The Court upheld the search in T.L. 0. because there

had been a reasonable suspicion that T.L.O. had cigarettes in her
purse. 264 Thus a new exception to the warrant requirement was born,

allowing warrantless searches of persons without probable cause and
254. See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-63 (1969) (warrantless search of arrestee and
area into which arrestee may reach reasonable to protect officer's safety and to preserve evidence).
255. See Warden, Maryland Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298-99 (1967) ("The Fourth
Amendment does not require police officers to delay in the course of an investigation if to do so
would gravely endanger their lives or the lives of others.").
256. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968) (warrant procedure not practical in street confrontations during police investigations; reasonable belief by officer that suspect is armed supports search
of the person without warrant).
257. See United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 824 (1982) (police may search all areas of vehicleincluding closed containers-for which they have probable cause that would justify a warrant).
258. 105 S. Ct. 733 (1985).
259. Id. at 736-37.
260. Id. at 740.
261. Id. at 743.
262. Id.
263. Id. at 746.
264. Id. The Court did not discuss the obvious alternative of allowing such searches for school
discipline purposes, but not allowing the evidence to be used in a criminal prosecution unless a
warrant was used or, at least, probable cause as to a criminal violation existed.
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with only a reasonable suspicion that a school rule, as opposed to a crimi-

nal provision, is being violated.
The problem is not simply one of creating exceptions to broad constitutional rules. It is a continuing and inevitable process. Exceptions

are created to avoid applying the rules mechanistically and producing an
unjust result, but the exception then becomes a mechanistic rule in its
own right. Accordingly, exceptions to the exception must in turn be created, and so on. The automobile cases illustrate this process with respect
to one of the exceptions to the fourth amendment warrant requirement.2 65 After Chambers v. Maroney2 66 validated a warrantless search of
a car after the driver had been arrested and the car taken to a police

station, the Court, in a series of cases, considered not whether there
should be an automobile exception, but the scope of the exception. In an

effort to avoid the application of a clear rule-that automobiles may be
searched without a warrant-that was an exception to another clear
rule-that warrants must always be used-the Court engaged in fine doc-

trinal distinctions and seemed to lose sight of the basic constitutional
requirement of reasonableness.

In Arkansas v. Sanders,267 the Court established an exception to the
automobile exception: a suitcase found in a car is not covered by the
automobile exception-it can only be searched pursuant to a warrant. 2 68
Although Sanders is flatly inconsistent with Chambers,269 the Court
claimed that it was not.270 In United States v. Ross, 27 1 the Court over-

ruled Sanders,2 72 restoring the automobile exception to its full glory:
"[I]f probable cause justifies the search of a lawfully stopped vehicle, it
justifies the search of every part of the vehicle and its contents ....

27 3
,,

265. See supra notes 70-107 and accompanying text.
266. 399 U.S. 42, 52 (1970).
267. 442 U.S. 753 (1979).
268. Id. at 763.
269. In Chambers,the Court held that, where probable cause exists, a car and its contents may
be searched without a warrant. Chambers, 399 U.S. at 50-52. In Sanders, where probable cause
existed as to a suitcase that the police observed being placed in a car, the Court held that the carbut not the suitcase-could be searched without a warrant. Sanders, 442 U.S. at 763-65. Although
the Court's reasons for distinguishing Chambers were not necessarily illogical-the search was directed at the suitcase, not the car, and it is easier for police to impound suitcases than cars-the
Sanders opinion nevertheless changed the contours of the Chambers holding.
270. See, eg., Sanders, 442 U.S. at 765 n.14.
271. 456 U.S. 798 (1982).
272. The Ross decision was prompted by Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420,425 (1981) (plurality opinion), in which the Court extended Sanders one logical step further in holding that a package
wrapped in green opaque plastic also could not be searched without a warrant.
273. Ross, 456 U.S. at 825. The narrow holding of Sanders was not overruled by Ross: if probable cause only exists as to the contents of the suitcase, rather than the car as a whole, then a warrant
must still be obtained. See Ross, 456 U.S. at 824. Thus Ross places the police in the anomalous
position of being better off with nonspecific probable cause than with probable cause that identifies
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Thus the perceived need to decide cases justly led the Court first to create
and then to abolish an exception to another exception. This sort of
wheel-spinning must be expected when the Court succumbs to its natural
desire to set forth clear rules.
Not only did Ross firmly establish that the police may fully search
automobiles on probable cause alone, it also changed the contours of the
earlier decisions in Carrolland Sanders. Stare decisis thus distorts both
Ross and the cases on which it relies. As Justice Marshall noted in his
Ross dissent, "[u]nder Carroll,.. the mobility of an automobile is what
is critical to the legality of a warrantless search"; 2 74 the Ross Court ignored that factor.
Thus the case-or-controversy requirement limits the Court's choice
of issues; the need for flexible responses forces them to discard or modify
clear rules; and stare decisis and the line-drawing problem ensure that
the new rule will be unclear, as will the precedent on which that new rule
is based. Uncertainty is thus inevitable. As in the nineteenth century,
when courts purported to "find" the "true meaning" of unclear precedents and constitutional provisions, the Court is actually manipulating
precedents to suit its purposes. This mystical process creates just as
much cynicism and confusion today as it did in 1938, when the Court, in
Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, 275 purported to have abandoned the claim
that law could be "found" and admitted to "making" law. 276 Now the
Court admits to making law, but claims to do so on the basis of precedents that are just as manipulable as the old concept of law. The upshot
is that a person trying in good faith to discover the legally prescribed
course of conduct has the illusion of being able to do so by consulting, or
hiring a lawyer to consult, a Supreme Court case and finding language to
support the legality of the course of action that he wishes to take. Everyone would be better off if the Court would simply say: "There are no
rules-try to act reasonably. If you do not, you will lose in court."
III.

LIVING WITH UNCERTAINTY

It has been shown that the Court is generally incapable of resolving
constitutional disputes in a way that will provide guidance for future actors. Clear lines can rarely be drawn and, when they can, the Court does
the specific location of contraband. The Supreme Court recently split 4-4 on a case that would have
allowed it to resolve this dilemma. See Castleberry v. State, 678 P.2d 720, 724 (Okla. Crim. App.
1984) (probable cause as to contraband in a specific container in a car does not justify warrantless
search of the container), aff'd mem. per curiam by an equally divided court, 105 S. Ct. 1859 (1985).
274. Ross, 456 U.S. at 832 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
275. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
276. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
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not adhere to them when the line produces unjust results. To the extent
that clarity is desired, the only options are having "no rules" (pure case2 77
by-case balancing) or avoiding issues altogether by denying certiorari.
Where the Court is unwilling to adopt either of these options, it must
recognize that its decisions will provoke litigation and doctrinal confusion while merely refocusing, rather than ending, debate.
As discussed, the Court has purported to declare clear rules in a
variety of different areas while consistently failing to follow those rules.
The purported existence of such rules causes much confusion and encourages lower courts to apply such rules mechanically to produce unjust
results, or to use the unclear rules and conflicting precedent to justify any
desired result.
The Supreme Court agrees, for example, that reasonableness is the
"fundamental inquiry in considering Fourth Amendment issues. ' 278 It
describes its decisional process as "balancing [the] intrusion [of a particular law enforcement practice] on the individual's Fourth Amendment in' 279
terests against its promotion of legitimate governmental interests.
That is precisely what is proposed here. However, when the Court discusses "reasonableness" and "balancing," it means deciding whether a
particular practice, such as "stop and frisk," is reasonable when performed without a warrant in a particular case and, having concluded that
it is, allowing the practice in all future cases. 2 0 The Court has flatly
refused to engage in pure case-by-case balancing:
Under this approach, police officers would have to guess before every
search whether landowners had erected fences sufficiently high, posted
a sufficient number of warning signs or located contraband in an area
sufficiently secluded to establish a right of privacy. The lawfulness of
each search would turn on "a highly sophisticated set of rules, qualified by all sorts of ifs, ands and buts and requiring the drawing of sub277. Critics of my approach may recognize that I proposed, as one of two possible solutions to
the fourth amendment's ills, a Miranda-type, bright-line approach in a recent article, See Bradley,
supra note 71, at 1492 (suggesting that search warrants always be required when it is feasible to
obtain them). As noted in that article, such an approach would raise many questions, see id. at 149798, but I still believe it preferable to the current, totally confused, fourth amendment doctrine. However, the only way to achieve true doctrinal consistency would be to determine the reasonableness of

each search case by case-i.e., to admit the inherent inconsistency in the law.
278. United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 9 (1977).
279. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979); see also United States v. Villamonte.Marquez, 462 U.S. 579, 589 (1983) (upholding warrantless search of boat and emphasizing governmental
interest in inspection of vessel documentation).
280. The Court's discussion of the need to provide clear rules to police in New York v. Belton,

453 U.S. 454 (1981), is a good example of this process at work. See id. at 458-59 (entire interior of
an automobile, including any containers in the interior, may be searched incident to a lawful arrest).
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tie nuances and hairline distinctions ....

,,281

Ironically, Justice Rehnquist, joined by the Chief Justice and Justice

O'Connor, all of whom concurred in the above statement, had commented the year before in a dissenting opinion that a search such as the

one invalidated by the majority opinion "would pass muster with virtually all thoughtful, civilized persons not overly steeped in the mysteries of

this Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.

'282

These Justices advo-

2 83
cated case-by-case determinations of reasonableness as the solution.
Certainly these Justices were correct in that dissenting opinion. It is the

Court's repeated effort to draft rules governing police behavior that has
inevitably led to these "mysteries."

In some first amendment cases, the Court has unsuccessfully attempted to engage in case-by-case balancing. Thus, in Erznoznik v. City

of Jacksonville,2 84 the Court stated that first amendment cases "demand
delicate balancing" in which "each case ultimately must depend on its

own specific facts.

28 5

The Court, however, then delineated "general

principles [that] have emerged, ' 28 6 proceeded to discuss precedent, and
finally declared rules for future cases. 28 7 Erznoznik in turn became pre-

cedent for later cases. 2 88 Yet, as the dissent correctly observed,
"[a]lthough the Court pays lip service to the proposition that 'each case

ultimately must depend on its own specific facts,' ... it strikes down [the
ordinance] by a mechanical application of 'general principles' distilled

from cases having little to do with either this case or each other. ' 28 9 The
dissent then proceeded mechanically to apply the case law to reach the
opposite result. The Court is never willing to engage in true case-by-case

balancing, involving a simple listing of the competing considerations and
281. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 181 (1984) (quoting New York v. Belton, 453 U.S.
454, 458 (1981) (quoting LaFave, "Case-by-CaseAdjudication" versus "StandardizedProcedures".
The Robinson Dilemma, 1974 Sup. Cr. REv. 127, 142)).
282. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 520 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
283. Id. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The dissenting Justices then proceeded to argue that the
search was permissible "even in terms of the most meticulous regard for our often conflicting cases."

Id.
284. 422 U.S. 205 (1975).
285. Id. at 208-09; see also Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 126 (1959) ("Where First
Amendment rights are asserted to bar governmental interrogation resolution of the issue always
involves a balancing by the courts of the competing private and public interests at stake in the
particular circumstances shown."); see generally Emerson, supra note 129, at 438-40, 447-54 (discussing examples of balancing by the Court in first amendment cases).
286. Erznoznik 422 U.S. at 209.
287. Id. at 210-12.
288. See, e.g., Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 520 (1976) (citing Erznoznik for the proposition
that "what a municipality may not do under the First and Fourteenth Amendments is to discriminate in the regulation of expression on the basis of the content of that expression").
289. Erznoznik, 422 U.S. at 218-19 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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a statement of the result. The Justices always attempt to justify the result
by reference to general principles distilled from past cases.
The only "rule" that will not raise an infinite number of complicated
questions is a non-rule. The Court could fulfill its obligations in many
cases simply by announcing that states must, on balance, have an adequate interest to suppress speech or that a search must, on balance, be
reasonable considering all relevant factors. Under this approach, the
greater the needs of the state in a particular case, the greater the infringement on individual liberty that will be tolerated. 290 Any attempt to explain why one case was decided differently than another case, or to give
hints to guide future conduct, will cause the same problems that currently plague the Court.
This approach is not appropriate for every case. Sometimes the
Court may actually be able to produce relative certainty by deciding, for
example, between two possible interpretations of a statute. In other
cases, such as Miranda,the Court may conclude that an ad hoe approach
will not produce just results because, in the "swearing contest" concerning whether or not a confession was voluntary, defendants will never be
believed. The Court may wish to use a case as a vehicle to shift legal
doctrine in a more "liberal" or "conservative" direction. This was the
purpose of Miranda and Brown v. Board of Education. Balancing, a neutral2 9 1 process that tends to preserve the doctrinal status quo, would not
have achieved the Court's goals in these cases.
Before concluding that it is preferable to declare a rule, the Court
should recognize the pitfalls. If the rule is not entirely clear, as rules
virtually never are,2 92 there is a risk that the rule will swallow reason;
courts and officials will justify their decisions on the basis of the rule and
cases interpreting the rule, and will lose sight of the constitutional values
that the rule was designed to promote.
For example, in Oregon v. Mathiason,2 9 3 the Court considered the
290. Although I recommend this balancing process for all courts, it must begin with the
Supreme Court. As long as the Supreme Court has a warrant "requirement," for example, a lower
court must endeavor to apply it, however much uncertainty that attempt will create. Of course, once
the Supreme Court has begun balancing in an area, then lower courts may do so as well.
291. Balancing is "neutral" in the sense that an empty scale is neutral. The fact that one plans to
decide a case by balancing does not, or should not, suggest what the result will be. Of course,
depending on the individual judge's conception of what constitutes a just result, the actual outcome
of a decided case will not necessarily be viewed as "neutral."
292. One exception is the concurring view of Justices Douglas and Brennan, in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 240, 257 (1972) (per curiam), that the death penalty is flatly unconstitutional.
Were this the rule, it would have no unclear boundaries and would not be excepted in the hard case.
Similarly, the rights to counsel and against self-incrimination at trial, although not clear in every
respect, have created few problems. See supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text.
293. 429 U.S. 492 (1977) (per curiam).
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case of a parolee who agreed to meet a police officer at a state patrol
office. When the defendant arrived, he was told that he was not under
arrest and was interviewed across a desk in a regular office. The officer
falsely told him that his fingerprints had been found at the scene of a
burglary. The defendant then admitted to the burglary, was advised of
his Miranda rights, and gave a taped confession. He was then allowed to
leave but was later arrested and convicted. 294 The Court decided that the
Miranda warning was not necessary in this case because the defendant
was not "in custody. ' 295 Had the policeman given the Mirandawarning,
presumably the Court would have had no interest in the case at all.
Whether or not the warning was given seems to be beside the main point
2 96
of the case-whether the police may use deceit to elicit confessions.
Had the Court weighed all relevant factors here, it might have concluded
that this confession could not be used. Instead it was distracted by the
"custody" question and never considered the more troubling issue in the
case. The point is that, even though the Miranda rule generally pushed
fifth amendment doctrine in a "liberal" direction, courts sometimes are
so engrossed in the fine points of the rule that they will allow police behavior that would not have been permissible had there been no rule. The
same is clearly true in the search and seizure area. This is "mechanical
jurisprudence" of the same sort that Pound denounced in 1908.297
By contrast, ad hoc balancing, including the threat of ad hoc review
by the courts, forces courts and officials to focus on the Constitution instead of on artificial constructs that have been developed in a futile effort
to render the Constitution more certain. To be sure, such an approach
gives no guidance to officials or courts. The point of this article is that
such guidance is usually impossible to give. Consequently, it is a mistake
to claim to give it.
A Court that produces fourth amendment doctrines described by its
members as full of "mysteries" and "intolerably confusing," 29 8 and first
amendment cases termed "bizarre" 299 and said to constitute a "Tower of
294. Id. at 493.94.
295. Id. at 495.
296. In Germany, admissions obtained through deceit may not be used at trial. See -Bradley,
supra note 13, at 1034.
297. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
298. See Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 520 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., joined by Burger, C.J., and
O'Connor, J., dissenting) (conduct of officers in case would "pass muster" with persons "not overly
steeped in the mysteries of this Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence"); Robbins v. California,
453 U.S. 420, 430 (1981) (Powell, J., concurring) ("[T]he law of search and seizure with respect to
automobiles is intolerably confusing.").
299. Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 555 (1981) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) ("Today
the Court takes an extraordinary-even a bizarre-step by severely limiting the power of a city to
act on risks it perceives to traffic safety and the environment posed by large, permanent billboards.").
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Babel, from which no definitive principles can be clearly drawn, ' 30 0 can
hardly complain that another approach does not provide clear guide-

lines. 301 The current system breeds not only confusion but contempt. A
set of guidelines is followed in one case to produce one result, "followed"

in another case to produce an opposite result, and ignored altogether in a
third case. 30 2 How a judge decides a particular search and seizure, or
freedom of religion, or freedom of speech case has less to do with these

infinitely manipulable guidelines than with his general political outlook
or, sometimes it seems, what he or she had for breakfast. Yet, if that
judge has approved a blatantly discriminatory religious practice or obviously unreasonable search, he or she can always point to some Supreme

Court precedent to support such a holding. Under the regime of "clear
guidelines," determining whether an automobile rather than a house was
searched, for example, becomes far more important than whether the
search was actually reasonable.30 3 It is preferable to have judges rule

based upon their best efforts at deciding what is just and reasonable, and
to have them defend their actions in those terms, rather than to allow
them to hide behind vague doctrines in order to justify patently unrea300. Id. at 569 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). See also Oregon v. Elstad, 105 S. Ct. 1285, 1293, 1297
(1985) (referring to the Mirandarules as "slippery," "difficult," and "murky"); Committee for Pub.
Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 662 (1980) (in establishment clause cases, the
Court has "sacrifice[d] clarity and predictability for flexibility"); id. at 671 (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(referring to "the sisyphean task of trying to patch together the 'blurred, indistinct, and variable
barrier' described in Lemon v. Kurtzman [403 U.S. 602, 614 (1971)]"). Concurring in Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973), Justice Powell discussed the Court's fourth amendment doctrine
as follows:
Searches and seizures are an opaque area of the law ....
[T]here is a vast twilight zone
with respect to which one Justice has stated that our own "decisions... are hardly notable
for their predictability," and another has observed that the Court was "bifurcating elements too infinitesimal to be split."
Id. at 269 (footnote omitted).
301. As Professor Emerson has observed, "[w]hatever the attitude, there is little question that
most commentators would decide the majority of first amendment cases by balancing." Emerson,
supra note 129, at 438.
302. The test in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971), for example, governs whether
a given practice causes excessive entanglement between church and state; consider "applications" of
the Lemon test in, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 105 5. Ct. 2479, 2490-93 (1985) (invalidating legislation
authorizing a moment of silence for "meditation or voluntary prayer" in Alabama public schools);
Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 681-85 (1984) (upholding municipal sponsorship of creche);
Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 792-95 (1983) (upholding Nebraska's practice of opening legislative sessions with prayer led by chaplain).
303. See Justice Brennan's dissent in Maryland v. Macon, 105 S. Ct. 2778 (1985), which accuses
the majority of "mechanical application of... precedents" because it held that an illegal arrest could
not be challenged, even in a case involving first amendment interests, when the arrest did not lead to
the seizure of evidence. Id. at 2785-86. Of course, such mechanical application is the raison d'tre of
a clear rule.
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sonable acts and decisions. 30 4
Justice Holmes explained the "clear guidelines" fallacy nearly a century ago:
[T]he logical method and form flatter that longing for certainty and for
repose which is in every human mind. But certainty generally is illusion, and repose is not the destiny of man. Behind the logical form lies
a judgment as to the relative worth . . . of competing legislative
grounds, often an inarticulate and unconscious judgment, it is true,
and yet the very root and nerve of the whole proceeding. 30 5
This is the key to my approach. When it attempts to decide a case
that requires the striking of a balance, as opposed to a declaration of
absolute constitutional rights, the Court should be conscious of the
"judgment as to relative worth" and should articulate that and that
alone, rather than muddy the waters with fatuous references to the "will
of the founding fathers" and precedent. We would then achieve not clarity, but a clear understanding of the function of uncertainty in the judicial process.
This approach is not simply one of applying the individual values of
the judge to achieve a result-a so-called Chancellor's Foot approachfor two reasons. First, by stating the competing points to be weighed, the
Justices have shown that the decision is not the product of mere whimsy
or arbitrariness but of a careful reasoning process. In my view, this is the
most that can be expected of them, because the attempt to derive decisions directly from precedents, neutral principles, the intent of the framers, and the like is not only vain but misleading. I believe that the public
would not only tolerate but applaud this forthrightness. Although a
judge's personal preferences will be no more or less influential than at
present, it will be easier to discern those preferences in a decision that
does not hide them behind the cloak of precedent.
Second, even if a Supreme Court Justice tried to decide cases on the
basis of his or her individual values, some compromise would still be
necessary in order to attract a majority of votes. Thus a Justice's initial
304. An argument frequently made against the ad hoe reasonableness approach in the fourth
amendment area is that it favors law enforcement. See, eg., United States v. Sharpe, 105 S. Ct. 1568,
1578 (1985) (Marshall, J., concurring) ("To those who rank zealous law enforcement above all other
values, it may be tempting to divorce Terry from its rationales and merge the two prongs of Terry
into the single requirement that police act reasonably under all the circumstances."). This argument
assumes that if the Court issues "guidelines," then conservative judges will follow them rather than
use them as a shield for doing what they want to do anyway-an assumption that I dispute. Moreover, as I have argued, mechanical rules (such as the automobile exception) can be and are applied
against defendants as often as for them. Finally, I agree with Justice Powell, concurring in
Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 65 (1972): "[T]his Court should not assume that the past
insensitivity of some state courts to the rights of defendants will continue."
305. Holmes, supra note 25, at 466.
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approach to a problem in conference, as well as the subsequent written
opinion, would have to be more thoughtful and reasoned than an approach based on mere personal preference. Not only would the public
refuse to accept a decision "because I say so," neither would a majority
of the Justice's colleagues. Consequently, such an arbitrary argument
would never even be advanced, much less succeed. A Supreme Court
decision, in its broad outlines, is just as much a product of compromise
as a legislative decision, even though the publicly disseminated outcome
of that decision may be a simple "affirmed." Similarly, a trial court judge
would need to compromise because his or her decision is subject to review on appeal. Critics of the "individual values" approach seem to
overlook these facts. The approach suggested here would more accurately reflect the realities of the decisionmaking process.
Another problem raised by balancing is identifying the central concept on which the balance is to be struck-the fulcrum. It is this fulcrum
that provides the fundamental "neutral principle" on which the decision
is based. 30 6 What the fulcrum is depends on one's view of the current
state of a given constitutional doctrine. In discussing how balancing
could have been applied in the recent post-Miranda case of Oregon v.
Elstad,307 this article suggests that a balancing process would probably
assume that the Miranda warnings would continue to be required-an
assumption that most members of the Court seem willing to make. Thus,
such cases would turn on the question whether a given statement was
voluntary and the suspect was informed of his Miranda rights rather
than merely whether the statement was voluntary, as in pre-Miranda
days. If a Justice were ardently opposed to the Miranda requirement
that the suspect be informed, then he would not be willing to begin the
balancing process until that requirement had been abandoned or else he
would balance without regard to the requirement. Although the Court
could certainly shift doctrine in the Miranda area by simply ignoring the
warnings requirement in the balancing process-thus sending a message
to future litigants that the warnings were not required-this would not
be a desirable approach. Because such a decision would have declared a
new rule, there would be a great effort to discern that rule from the contents of the Court's brief decision. This would lead to more confusion
than at present. It would be far better to render a full opinion explaining
306. See Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1
(1959). Neutral principles should not be abandoned altogether. For example, the fundamental
fourth amendment requirement of "reasonableness" should be employed in determining the legality

of searches. These principles, however, cannot both provide specific guidance for deciding particular
cases and avoid the trap of mechanical jurisprudence.
307. 105 S. Ct. 1285 (1985). See infra notes 333-63 and accompanying text.
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that the Mirandawarnings were no longer required and that future cases
would be decided under a balancing approach. 308 The Court could adopt
voluntariness as the fulcrum and list examples of factors that would be
taken into account. Or the Court might wish to go further and establish
"reasonableness" as the standard, thus allowing even involuntary statements under extreme circumstances. 30 9 Whatever the choice, it would be
better than the current practice of distinguishing away pieces of Miranda-always claiming to "clarify" it and "resolve doubt"-until there
is nothing left but confusion.
Similarly, in fourth amendment cases, the obvious standard is the
reasonableness of a search or seizure. Alternatively, the Court could use
the reasonableness of not obtaining a warrant as the fulcrum, requiring a
warrant unless it was reasonable not to obtain one. In church/state
cases, an appropriate fulcrum would be whether a given arrangement is
an "excessive" entanglement between church and state. In each area,
resort to balancing should be preceded by a full opinion determining
what the standard is to be, so that lower courts could then balance
appropriately.
When decisions are stripped of the cloak of obedience to precedent,
the "will of the framers," and so forth, the reasoning process will be
visible for all to see. True consistency with prior decisions will be enhanced, not decreased. Manipulation of precedent to justify results will
become less important as a judicial skill, and decisions will be more likely
to form a consistent, or at least explicably inconsistent, body of law.
This article suggests that stare decisis, when used to describe the
Supreme Court's practice of basing holdings on prior decisions, could be
profitably abandoned in many cases. Stare decisis, however, plays another role in our judicial system that cannot be so readily dismissed. It
provides that lower courts are bound by Supreme Court decisions on the
same issue. An example will demonstrate why this aspect of stare decisis
must be maintained. In Miranda v. Arizona, the Court required the administration of warnings whenever a suspect was subjected to "custodial
interrogation. '31 0 In Oregon v. Mathiason,3 11 the Court resolved one of
the many questions raised by the Mirandaholding-whether a suspect is
in "custody" when he comes to a police station voluntarily to be questioned about a crime-by holding that the suspect is not in custody for
308. This outcome would be preferable assuming one approves of the rejection of Miranda.
309. One could achieve this in a manner consistent with the fifth amendment only by reverting
to the pre-Escobedo view that the amendment only protects the defendant at trial.
310. 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
311. 429 U.S. 492 (1977).
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purposes of Miranda.31 2 Because this question undoubtedly came up

fairly often after Miranda,it was useful for the Court to resolve it and, to
the extent that the same issue is presented in other cases, the smooth
functioning of the legal system is promoted by the fact that lower courts

are bound by this result. Moreover the principal problem with stare decisis is avoided, because a lower court's discussion of Mathiason cannot

authoritatively distort that holding. Because lower courts will frequently
be presented with the Mathiason issue, the principal benefit of stare deci313
sis-finality of decision-is maintained.
To summarize the approach that should be taken: In general, many

fewer cases should be decided in the traditional manner. 314 The Court

should limit itself to deciding few "fully-reasoned" cases based on the
traditional sources, such as constitutional doctrine and prior cases. The

rare fully-reasoned decision should establish the fulcrum or neutral principle with sufficient generality that it can be consistently applied in the
future. Subsequent decisions applying this main case should be brief.
The Court should not attempt to make these decisions conform to precedent, to give reasons for the decision (beyond stating the factors balanced

and the fulcrum used), or to provide guidelines for later cases. In cases
312. Id. at 495.
313. To the extent that subsequent cases differ somewhat from Mathiason, lower courts can
attempt to discern from Mathiason how such cases should be resolved. For example, suppose the
police stopped a suspect on the street and "asked" him to accompany them in a police car to the
police station for questioning. (In Mathiason the officer merely left a note asking the suspect to
call-they met at the police station as a matter of mutual convenience. Mathiason, 429 U.S. at 493.)
Lower courts should decide the new case with reference to Mathiason, and, if a conflict develops, the
Supreme Court should resolve it, as the Court did in Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 219
(1979) (holding that custodial questioning with less than probable cause violates the fourth amendment despite the use of Mirandawarnings prior to the questioning).
Nonetheless, lower court decisions in post-Mathiason cases were not aided by Mathiason'sgeneral discussion of Miranda or by other justifications offered by the Mathiason Court. All that the
Court needed to do in Mathiason was to resolve the issue by balancing the facts. See Mathiason,429
U.S. at 495 ("Any interview of one suspected of a crime by a police officer will have coercive aspects
to it, simply by virtue of the fact that the police officer is part of a law enforcement system ....
But police officers are not required to administer Miranda warnings to everyone whom they question."). The Court's discussion of precedent, picking out those portions of Mirandathat supported
the result and ignoring those portions that did not, distorted Miranda. Mathiason, 429 U.S. at 49899 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (stressing that Mirandawas meant to be a broad protection and that the
interrogation in Mathiason, though not "custodial," was just as coercive as a custodial interrogation). Other discussion in Mathiason may be picked out selectively in future Court decisions, thus
distorting Mathiason itself. To the extent that stare decisis requires Supreme Court discussion of,
and the fiction of obeisance to, precedent, it should be abandoned. To the extent that stare decisis
requires lower court deference to Supreme Court holdings on both the same and related points, it
must be retained.
314. The ongoing expansion of the federal judiciary, and the proposed creation of a national
court of appeals, only exacerbate the problem. It would be better to have fewer judges who, pressed
by time, would write fewer and shorter opinions. For an insightful discussion of the mischief caused
by judicial prolixity, see R. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 109 (1985).

Vol. 1986:1]

THE UNCERTAINTY PRINCIPLE

where an ideological shift is desired, it is preferable to determine what
the new standard will be before beginning the balancing process.
Although case-by-case balancing does not create certainty, it puts the

Court's prejudices up front rather than allowing it to justify decisions by
reference to inappropriate precedent and unconvincing doctrine. It ex-

poses the "root and nerve" of every decision for the legal community and

public to see. 315 Moreover, it does not provide the illusion of guidelines
and precedents behind which future actors can hide. Cars could then be

searched, for example, only when such searches were reasonable, not
simply when they fell mechanically within the terms of the "automobile

exception."
IV. Two

CASE STUDIES IN UNCERTAINTY

Up to this point, I have described the uncertainty principle, given
examples of the principle at work, and explained why it works as it does.
An additional test of the validity of a proposition is whether it can predict future results. Because the thrust of this article is that Supreme
Court Justices should take the uncertainty principle into account before
voting to grant certiorari, it is particularly important that one can accurately foresee how it will work in a given case. Accordingly, I consider
two recent cases: one case is Lynch v. Donnelly,3 16 which involves the
first amendment, and the other is Oregon v. Elstad,3 17 a post-Miranda
case. My prediction is that it will soon be recognized that these cases
have served no useful societal purpose and will lead to great doctrinal
confusion-confusion so great that more than one Justice will be forced
to admit that "our doctrine in this area is an enigma wrapped in a mystery," 3 18 or words to that effect, just as they have done in the obscenity
and automobile cases discussed earlier. 319
315. Jerome Frank discusses the example of Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1
(1911), and United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911), the two cases in which the
Court, contrary to its earlier decisions, adopted the "rule of reason" in interpreting the Sherman Act
and claimed that the Court had always interpreted the Act in that manner. Why didn't the Court
acknowledge the prior cases and simply overrule the precedents? "Because to have made such a bald
statement would have been to make too painfully clear the fact of retroactive law-making by the
(C]ourt." J. FRANK, LAV AND THE MODERN MIND 22-26 (1930).
316. 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
317. 105 S. Ct. 1285 (1985).
318. This process has already begun: Justice Rehnquist recently observed, dissenting in Wallace
v. Jaffree, 105 S.Ct. 2479, 2516 (1985), that "[o]ur recent opinions, many of them hopelessly divided
pluralities, have with embarrassing candor, conceded that the 'wall of separation' [between church
and state] is merely a 'blurred, indistinct, and variable barrier,' which 'is not wholly accurate' and
can only be 'dimly perceived.'" (citations omitted).
319. See supra notes 70-128 and accompanying text.
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Lynch v. Donnelly.

In Lynch, the Supreme Court held that a city-sponsored Christmas
320 It is
display, including a creche, did not violate the first amendment.
not my purpose to offer detailed criticism of the particular holding in
Lynch, which has already been ably critiqued. 32 ' Rather, my purpose is
to consider the case from the perspective of a Justice trying to decide
whether certiorari should be granted: if the case were to be decided in
favor of permitting the Christmas display by the city, the Court would
need to distinguish between this religious exercise and others that have
been disallowed. Yet this case, as Professor William Van Alstyne has
subsequently indicated, seems to present a clear example of a law respecting an establishment of religion. 32 2 Imagine a Justice confronted with
the decision whether to grant certiorari on a case presenting these facts:
1. The overt alignment of government with the particular theology of
one, politically dominant, religious sect;
2. The collaboration of government with commercial interests to
stimulate consumer purchases by the government's own promotional
use of a particular religion's artifacts and mysteries;
3. The propagation under government sponsorship of distinctly religious symbols uniquely associated with one sect's most holy eventthe miracle of divine birth of its particular prophet and messiah;
4. The purchase and maintenance through tax levies, and promotional display in outdoor public location each year, of sectarian objects,
during the season designated for the Mass or eucharist of one religion's
323
principal sacrament.
It does seem that any attempt to approve this display would require
us to blur the second and third prongs of the Lemon v. Kurtzman 324 test.
That is, this display does seem to have the primary effect of promoting
Christ's mass and, because it is sponsored by the government, it does
seem to involve an excessive governmental entanglement. Although we
could undoubtedly get around the Lemon test, it will be at some cost to
the clarity of that doctrine.
320. 465 U.S. 668 (1984).

321. See Van Alstyne, Trends in the Supreme Court: Mr. Jefferson's Crumbling Wall-A Comment on Lynch v. Donnelly, 1984 DUKE L.J. 770, 787 (Lynch holding represents a trend toward
national religious ethnocentrism); see also Tribe, ConstitutionalCalculus: EqualJustice orEconomic
Efficiency, 98 HARV. L. REv. 592, 610-11 (1985) (Lynch holding illustrates "the Court's technocratic disregard for the constitutive dimension of its judicial role").
322. Van Alstyne, supra note 321, at 781.
323. Id.

324. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971), established a three-part test for determining whether a statute violates the establishment clause: (1) it must have a secular purpose; (2) its

principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; and (3) it must
not foster "an excessive governmental entanglement with religion."
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Consider the other possibilities: we could take this opportunity to
prohibit all municipal involvement in Christmas and, while we're at it,
federal recognition of Christmas as a national holiday. This means, for
example, no creches, no street decorating or city cleanup of private decorating, and no municipal sponsorship of Christmas caroling. But even
this result would not produce consistent doctrine. Some governmental
recognition of religious activities, such as accreditation of parochial
schools and traffic control for church functions, is simply unavoidable if
the government is not to go to the opposite extreme of stifling religious
observance. 32 5 Moreover, an extreme anti-Christmas stand in this case
would not last. New Justices would quickly be appointed who would
overrule or distinguish this case.
Alternatively, we could claim that this display is somehow different,
i.e., more religious than other acceptable municipal participation in
Christmas celebrations, such as street decoration and caroling. Perhaps
"[the government's] seasonal celebration must at least be non-denominational and not serve to promote religion. ' 326 But it is hard to see how
any sponsorship of Christmas celebrations by the city could be considered "non-denominational" by Jews, Moslems, and Hindus. 32 7 The
problem is that separating the "distinctly religious" 32 8 aspects of this religious holiday from the secular aspects is impossible. Is Christmas music,
for example, religious or secular? It is difficult to argue that "Silent
Night" or "Oh Come All Ye Faithful" are anything but religious; yet to
bar the city from playing them, or from hanging speakers from municipal
streetlights, would be to adopt a Scrooge-like attitude toward Christmas
cheer that no Justice would seem willing to entertain.
The most important goal, as Justice O'Connor notes, is to avoid
"[g]overnmental endorsement or disapproval of religion. ' 329 Any decision in this case will necessarily involve such endorsement or disapproval, and any rule adopted to justify that decision will encourage
greater endorsement or disapproval in the next case. To permit the municipal creche involves a strong endorsement of the Christian religion
and its principal holiday and encourages governments to go further in
the endeavor to "put Christ back in Christmas." To hold against the city
results in untenable distinctions of other, approved, governmental partic325. No member of the Court in Lynch advocated such an extreme position.
326. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 700 (Brennan, J.,dissenting).
327. As Professor Tribe has pointed out: "The Court's position [in Lynch] was that the government-sponsored nativity scene was no big deal; if any non-Christians felt alienated by it, that was
their problem." Tribe, supra note 321, at 611.
328. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 710 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
329. Id. at 688 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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ipation in religious practices and will subject the Court to public obloquy
for a decision that is not worth that cost.
In the actual Lynch decision, the Court did more to tread on the
religious sensitivities of minorities than the city of Pawtucket could ever
have done. As Justice Jackson pointed out, dissenting in Korematsu v.
United States,330 "a military commander may overstep the bounds of
constitutionality, and it is an incident. But if we review and approve, the
passing incident becomes the doctrine of the Constitution. There it has a
generative power of its own." 33 1 Far better to deny certiorari in this difficult case than to distort the tests announced in previous cases to justify a
result either way. The denial of certiorari will leave this particular issue
unsettled, but it will not create the host of new issues arising from any
332
attempt to resolve this case.
If, despite the above arguments, four members of the Court concluded that Lynch must be argued and decided, then, if we assume that
Lemon declared the proper fulcrum, it should simply have listed the factors considered on both sides, and stated the result. After a statement of
the facts and decisions below, the opinion might read as follows:
We considered the following factors, which favor petitioner (the city)
in the balance:
1. Similar religious practices, such as prayers in Congress, have traditionally been allowed and were accepted practice at the time the first
amendment was ratified.
2. The government has long recognized-indeed it has subsidizedholidays with religious significance and other graphic manifestations of
our religious heritage.
3. This display was motivated by secular as well as religious considerations and does not substantially aid religion.
330. 323 U.S. 224 (1944).

331. Id.at 246.
332. See, e.g., McCreary v. Stone, 739 F.2d 716, 730 (2d Cir. 1984), aff'd, Board of Trustees v.
McCreary, 105 S.Ct. 1859 (1985) (per curiam). McCreary presented the issue whether a private
group could force the city to display a cr che on public land. Id. at 716. An equally divided
Supreme Court affirmed the decision below in favor of the private group. Board of Trustees v.
McCreary, 105 S.Ct. 1859 (1985) (per curiam).

One might have argued that Lynch was simply the opening salvo, along with Marsh v. Cham.
bers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983), of an effort by the Court to reinstill religious values into our secular

society. If this were true, the confusion and consequent litigation created by Lynch would be just
what the Court wanted, providing more opportunities for advancing this view. It is probably a

mistake to attribute any such group motive to the collective activity of nine very independent operators on the Supreme Court. In any event, any such claim about Lynch and Marsh has surely been
dispelled by the recent decisions in Wallace v. Jaffree, 105 S.Ct. 2479, 2490-93 (1985) (Alabama law

authorizing daily period of silence in public schools for meditation or voluntary prayer was an enforcement of religion lacking any clear secular purpose and thus violated the first amendment), and
Grand Rapids School Dist. v. Ball, 105 S.Ct. 3216, 3230 (1985) (school district program providing
classes to nonpublic school students at public expense had effect of promoting religion and thus

violated the first amendment).
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4. There is no significant administrative entanglement between religion and state resulting from the city's ownership and use of the
creche.
5. This is a passive display requiring nothing of a nonreligious
observer.
We considered the following factors, which favor the respondent's
(citizens' group) position in the balance:
1. Despite the secular reasons for this display, religious reasons seem
to be predominant.
2. The secular objectives can be accomplished by other means.
3. Such a display indicates to nonbelievers and non-Christians that
their views are not worthy of public recognition or support.
4. Such a display poses a significant risk of excessive entanglement
between church and state. It may cause advocates of other religions to
demand "equal time."
On balance, we conclude that this display does not constitute an
excessive entanglement between church and state.
B.

Oregon v. Elstad.

The recent decision in Oregon v. Elstad333 further illustrates the uncertainty principle at work. In that case, an eighteen-year-old defendant
was arrested at his home for burglary. While one policeman explained to
Elstad's mother what was happening, the other spoke to Elstad in the
living room. After what the Court conceded was a brief "custodial interrogation concerning the burglary," 334 Elstad stated, "I was there. '3 35 Elstad was then transported to the sheriff's headquarters. One hour later
he was advised of his rights, waived them, and gave a full confession.
The Supreme Court agreed with the Oregon Court of Appeals and the
trial court that the first statement ("I was there") must be suppressed
under the rule of Miranda v. Arizona,336 but reversed the lower court's
conclusion that the second statement was a suppressible "fruit" of the
337
first statement.
As a matter of common sense, there is much to recommend the
Court's holding but little to recommend its rationale. The defendant was
not subjected to tactics designed to overbear his will, which is what Miranda was intended to preclude. 338 Although Elstad's questioning may
have fallen within the technical definition of "custodial interrogation," it
333. 105 S. Ct. 1285 (1985).
334. Id. at 1297.

335. Id. at 1289.
336. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
337. Elstad, 105 S. Ct. at 1298.
338. See the extended discussion of interrogation techniques in Miranda, 384 U.S. at 449-57.
"In the cases before us today ... we concern ourselves primarily with this interrogation [i.e., incommunicado and police-dominated] atmosphere and the evils it can bring." Id. at 456.
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had none of the physical attributes of custody nor the psychological attributes of interrogation that particularly concerned the Miranda Court.

Elstad was not held incommunicado for a long period of time at the police station and was not subjected to psychological ploys to elicit a
confession.
The Court admitted, however, that Elstadinvolved a custodial interrogation; the Court apparently felt compelled to do so by post-Miranda

precedent and by the posture of the case. 339 Once this point is conceded,
any reasonable reading of Miranda and the cases recognizing the psychological impact of "letting the cat out of the bag" 340 would seem to de-

mand that the second statement be suppressed as a fruit of the poisonous
tree. The bulk of the Court's opinion was an effort to fudge on the rather

341
obvious application of those cases to this one.
In other words, the Court, as usual, fell victim to the uncertainty

principle. In order to find that the second statement is not excludable as
a fruit of the poisonous tree, the Court concluded that there was no con-

stitutional violation (i.e., no constitutionally poisonous tree) because Miranda merely announced prophylactic rules to protect constitutional
342 If
rights-there is no constitutional right to the warnings themselves.

this is so, one wonders, along with Justice Stevens in dissent, how the
Court was able to strike down Miranda's own state court conviction; the

violation of mere prophylactic rules is not an adequate ground for overturning state convictions. 34 3

339. The Court noted that "[tihe state has conceded the issue of custody." Elstad, 105 S. Ct. at
1297. Because the questions in Elstad were designed to elicit a response from the defendant, they
constituted "interrogation" under the rule of Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 298-99 (1980).
340. See Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 605 n.12 (1975) ("The fact that Brown had made one
statement, believed by him to be admissible,... bolstered the pressures for him to give the second, or
at least vitiated any incentive on his part to avoid self-incrimination."); Harrison v. United States,
392 U.S. 219, 223 (1968) ("If [the accused testified] in order to overcome the impact of confessions
illegally obtained and hence improperly introduced, then his testimony was tainted by the same
illegality that rendered the confessions themselves inadmissible."); Beecher v. Alabama, 389 U.S. 35,
36 n.2 (1967) (per curiam) (noting that existence of earlier illegal confession is "vitally relevant to
the voluntariness of petitioner's later statements").
341. Justice Brennan accurately characterized the majority's effort in his dissent:
In imposing its new rule . . . the Court mischaracterizes our precedents, obfuscates the
central issues, and altogether ignores the practical realities of custodial interrogation that
have led nearly every lower court to reject its simplistic reasoning. Moreover, the Court
adopts startling and unprecedented methods of construing constitutional guarantees. Finally the Court reaches out once again to address issues not before us.
Elstad, 105 S. Ct. at 1299 (Brennan, J., dissenting). As an example of the last point, Justice Brennan
points out that "although the State of Oregon has conceded that the arresting officers broke the law
in this case, the Court goes out of its way to suggest that they may have been objectively justified in
doing so." Id.
342. Id. at 1292.
343. See Elstad, 105 S.Ct. at 1324 n.9 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
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The Court's explanation for this anomaly is convoluted: failure to
give the Mirandawarnings constitutes an irrebutable presumption of coercion (i.e., of a constitutional violation), but is not itself a constitutional
violation. 3 " This is a flat contradiction of Miranda, which held that
"[t]he requirement of warnings and waiver of rights is a fundamental
with respect to the Fifth Amendment privilege.1 345 When secondary use
of such an unwarned statement is considered-such as use of the statement for impeachment purposes and use of such a statement to obtain
other evidence 346-this presumption unaccountably fades away. In its
place, an ad hoe consideration of voluntariness-the very inquiry that
348
Mirandaspecifically eschewed 34 7-miraculously becomes appropriate.
Having thus distorted Miranda to find that there was no constitutionally poisonous tree in Elstad, the Court could have stopped. Instead
it went on to distort other cases in an attempt to demonstrate that Elstad's second statement was also not a fruit of the first one. It is true, as
the Court pointed out, that United States v. Bayer 349 held that "this
Court has never gone so far as to hold that making a confession under
circumstances which preclude its use, perpetually disables the confessor
'350
from making a usable one after these conditions have been removed.
But the Court failed to grapple with the main thrust of these cases-that
there must be a " 'sufficient break in the stream of events ... to insulate'
the subsequent confession from the damning impact of the first."'35 1 Instead, the Court again referred to the "voluntariness" of the original
statement. 352 The Court seems to assume that the lack of coercion during the first statement somehow makes it more "speculative 353 that the
second statement followed from the first than if the first statement were
obtained by more reprehensible tactics. Neither the precedents nor the
344. Id. at 1292-93.
345. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 476 (1966); see also Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324, 326
(1969) ("[Ihe use of these admissions obtained in the absence of the required warnings was a fiat
violation of the Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment .... ").
346. Elstad, 105 S. Ct. at 1293 (fruit of a noncoercive Miranda violation not subject to
exclusion).
347. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 458.
348. Justice Brennan made the following observation about the Court's analysis:
[T]he public will have understandable difficulty in comprehending how a confession obtained in violation of Mirandacan at once be (1) "irrebuttabl[y]" presumed to be the product of official compulsion, and therefore suppressible as a matter of federal constitutional
law... and (2) "non-coerc[ed]" and "wholly voluntary."
Elstad, 105 S. Ct. at 1316 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
349. 331 U.S. 532 (1947).
350. Elstad, 105 S. Ct. at 1294-95 (quoting United States v. Bayer, 331 U.S. 532, 540-41 (1947)).
351. Elstad, 105 S. Ct. at 1300 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting State v. Elstad, 61 Or. App.
673, 676, 658 P.2d 552, 554 (1983)).
352. Elstad, 105 S. Ct. at 1301.
353. Id.
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interrogation manuals cited by Justice Brennan support this particular
view of human psychology.35 4 It is the circumstances of the second statement-its distance in time and manner of attainment from the first-that
has always been considered significant.
The Elstad Court found itself in a box when it conceded that caseor-controversy limitations required it to accept the state's concession that
Elstad was in "custody" for the purposes of Miranda and that its own
precedents suggested that the initial questioning constituted "interrogation. '35 5 The Court's attempt to avoid the clear rule of Miranda-that
such custodial interrogation is, absent prior warnings, always a constitutional violation-makes the Justices look like shyster lawyers when they
are in fact engaged in a good faith effort to reach a just result. Nevertheless, as Justice Stevens observed, the attempt to identify the boundaries of
Elstad in future cases "will breed confusion and uncertainty in the administration of criminal justice. ' 356 For example, what if the police intentionally try to get the defendant to "let the cat out of the bag" before
giving him warnings? The Court characterized the failure to warn in
Elstad as essentially a good faith mistake resulting from "confusion"
about the "murky" concept of custody. 357 In other portions of the opinion, the lack of actual coercion during the first statement seemed to be
35 8
determinative, regardless of the motives of the police.
Suppose that Elstad had been interrogated in a locked room at the
police station but there is no evidence that his unwarned first statement
was not "voluntary." Does the Court's new definition of a "coerced" or
"involuntary" statement refer to the circuxhstances under which it was
taken or to the actual use of threats, violence, or psychological ploys by
the police? The Court's emphasis on the noncoercive atmosphere in
which Elstad was questioned 359 suggests that statements obtained at the
station would be considered a "poisonous tree." The Court's discussion
of the fact that the statement was "voluntary" and "not coerced" sug360
gests the opposite result.
Does it matter what transpired between the first and second statements? The Court ignores two important facts in Elstad: the second
354. Id. at 1303-06 (citing A. AUBRY & R. CAPUTO, CRIMINAL INTERROGATION 290 (3d ed.
1980); F. INBAU & J. REID, CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONs 82 (2d ed. 1967); R.
ROYAL & S. SCHUTT, THE GENTLE ART OF INTERVIEWING AND INTERROGATION: A PROFIs-

SIONAL
355.
356.
357.
358.
359.
360.

MANUAL AND GUIDE 143 (1976)).
Id. at 1290.
Id. at 1323 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1297.
Id. at 1293, 1295-96.
Id. at 1296-97.
Id. at 1291-92.
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statement was near in time to the first, and it was elicited by the same
officers. Earlier cases suggest that a "break in the stream of events" is
36 1
the critical factor.
Much of the opinion seems to be based on the noncustodial nature
of the first interrogation. A decision based on that fact would have been
much stronger and led to much less confusion, but there was no controversy on that point because the state had conceded the custody issue.
The Court was confined by the case-or-controversy doctrine, stare decisis, and its attempt to respond flexibly to the clear rule of Miranda. Consequently, it rendered a decision that distorted precedents and left
unanswered far more questions than it resolved.
A much simpler approach would have been preferable. The Court
should abandon the "murky" doctrine that now surrounds Miranda and
use the general rule of that case as the fulcrum on which to balance the
facts of future cases-that is, statements obtained from criminal suspects
must be reasonably voluntary and suspects must be informed of their
constitutional rights. In Elstad, the first statement was made while the
suspect was in custody, there was an interrogation, and there was no
reason not to inform him of his rights. The Court would therefore simply hold that the first statement must be suppressed. In addressing the
admissibility of the second statement, the Court could continue as
follows:
When the application of Miranda is in doubt, as with the second statement, we engage in balancing. On the one hand, the first statement
was not coerced, was taken in the suspect's home rather than in the
police station, and did not involve any period of detention prior to
questioning or use of psychological ploys to weaken the defendant's
will-factors that were considered significant in Miranda. Moreover,
it appears that, in this case, the failure to warn may have been the
result of confusion about whether or not the defendant was in custody-at least there is no indication that it was intentional. Finally,
the suspect was warned before he made the second statement. On the
other hand, the clear rule of Miranda was violated as to the first statement, which "let the cat out of the bag." This may have influenced the
defendant's willingness to repeat his confession after receipt of the
warnings. On balance, we conclude that the second statement was reasonably voluntary and informed, and its use at trial did not violate the
Fifth Amendment. Accordingly, we reverse.
Such a decision would not provide guidance for future cases. But at
least it is forthright in that respect. Elstad also provides no meaningful
guidance, but only a wealth of justification for the police to evade Miranda in a way that the Court probably never intended. Although Elstad
361. Id. at 1310 n.21 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing cases applying the "break in the stream of

events" test).
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is a glaring example, it is rather typical of Supreme Court decisions that
give only the illusion, but not the actuality, of guidance to future actors.
It is an illusion that allows those actors to follow the "rules" as they
interpret them and causes courts to review their acts in terms of artificial
constructs, without considering whether the actions comported with the
spirit of the Constitution.
To say that the current system provided clearer guidelines to the
police concerning the final result in Elstadis, in my view, flatly wrong. A
careful analysis of the precedents would indicate that the second statement could not be used. Yet six Justices agreed that the police behavior
in this case was reasonable and that the second statement was admissible. 362 As Justice Holmes observed, the balancing approach is the best
way to anticipate such a decision. 363 Foreknowledge that the Court was
going to use a balancing approach in Elstad would have produced a more
accurate prediction of results than any attempt to predict what it would
decide based on precedent.
V.

CONCLUSION

How is a Justice to decide whether a case is appropriate for pure ad
hoc balancing? There can, of course, be no hard and fast rules, as the
uncertainty principle would infect those rules just as it does any other. It
will depend on the Justice's goals in a particular case. A Justice who
simply wishes to "answer" questions raised by a main case, rather than
to advance particular ideological goals, should be amenable to ad hoc
balancing. This article has illustrated that, clarity being nearly impossible to attain regarding constitutional issues of any complexity, a new rule
is unlikely to be any clearer than the old one and attempts to clarify old
rules will only obfuscate them. In particular, certain conventions may
have developed in connection with an old rule. Despite its lack of clarity
at its inception, the old rule is probably causing less trouble than a new
one will. The automobile, commercial speech, and obscenity cases all
illustrate this point.
If a Justice has an ideological ax to grind, his assessment of ad hoc
balancing will depend on whether he believes that it will produce results
closer to his own viewpoint than the results of a particular "rule." One
purpose of this article has been to show that balancing is not only a neutral approach but an admittedly neutral approach. For example, if in a
fourth amendment case a judge strikes the balance strongly in favor of
362. Id. at 1294-98.
363. That is, a "judgment as to relative worth"-not obedience to precedent-is the "root and
nerve" of the Elstad decision. See supra note 305 and accompanying text.
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law enforcement, it will be obvious that he is doing so and he will be
criticized for not striking the balance correctly. Under the current system it is possible to mask these prejudices by claiming that a given result
is mandated by precedent. Although the balancing process is neutral, the
results may not be; but that lack of neutrality will be much more obvious
than it is now.
Ad hoe balancing, with no discussion of precedent and no guidelines
for the future, will tend to provide a stable doctrine. The old rules will
specify the question that the balancing process will resolve. Judges wishing to change the basic doctrine will not accept such balancing, but will
attempt to adopt new rules from which the balancing process may proceed. In my view, justice will be better served in most cases by balancing
rather than by trying to declare, apply, or clarify rules. The Court and
the public should recognize that the attainment of ideological goals,
rather than the achievement of clarity or neutral guidelines, can be the
only product of an extended discussion of constitutional doctrine or the
promulgation of new rules.
In 1930, Jerome Frank warned against the childish assumption that
law was an absolute that could be "found" by judges-a fiction that catered to an immature desire for certainty where none could truly exist:
Myth-making and fatherly lies must be abandoned [such as this] Santa
Claus story of complete legal certainty ....
We must stop telling
stork-fibs about how the law is born and cease even hinting that perhaps there is still some truth in the Peter Pan legends
of a juristic
3 64
happy hunting ground in a land of legal absolutes.
Our conception of law has now reached adolescence. We recognize
that law is not an absolute that is discovered by judges-it comes from
the judges themselves. But if we have stopped believing in the Santa
Claus of God-given law, we still cling to the Wizard of Oz of legal certainty. We expect, and the Supreme Court indulges our expectation, that
legal doctrine can be resolved and clear rules for future cases can be
promulgated. We demand that the Court provide "guidelines" for executive officials and lower courts, obstinately refusing to recognize that
such guidelines cannot be given. It is time to accept the burdens of maturity, both of the legal profession and of society. The Court should no
longer assume that it can fool the public into believing that judicial decisions are really based on precedent, any more than they were based on
the "fixed and immutable law" in centuries past; or if it can fool them, it
should no longer assume that this is a good thing. The Supreme Court
has taken the place of God in this secular age-a deity to whom we look
364. J. FRANK, supra note 315, at 244.
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for certainty and security.36 5 That deity must step down from its pedestal and admit that behind the facade of power and authority are nine
people trying to do right.

365. "IT]he United States Supreme Court ...is, so to speak, the institutional church that incarnates that sacred document.. . . 'In our tripartite constitutional system, it is the Holy of Holies.' "
Levinson, "The Constitution" in American Civil Religion, 1979 Sup. CT. REV. 123, 123-24 (quoting
Mason, The Supreme Court: Temple and Forum, 48 YALE REV. 524, 526 (1959)); see also Grey,
The Constitution as Scripture, 37 STAN. L. REv. 1, 22-23 (1984).

